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U.S. OCCUPATION OF OKINAWA IN RELATION TO POSTWAR POLICY TOWARD JAPAN (1943–1953)

Masahide Ota

This chapter will examine the U.S. occupation of Okinawa and attempt to relate it to general U.S. postwar policy toward Japan by clarifying the factors that lay behind the separation. Because of space limitations, discussion will be limited to events prior to 1952, when the peace treaty took effect.

The U.S. postwar occupation policy toward Japan and toward Okinawa are essentially two sides of the same coin. At first glance, the U.S. occupation of Japan seems to be one in which the "occupier" (the United States or the Allied nations) and the "occupied" (Japan proper) interacted directly. Schematically expressed, however, Okinawa stood between the occupier and the occupied, and the occupation of Okinawa made the occupation of Japan proper easier for the Allied forces. The United States thought of Okinawa as a "means" of maximizing the effectiveness and success of its occupation policies in Japan proper. On the other hand, for its own advantage and the eventual strengthening of its position as a defeated nation, Japan was perfectly willing to have part of its territory detached and used as a military base by the foreign occupying power. As a result of this coincidence of interests between the occupier and the occupied, Okinawa was not only detached from Japan proper but, against the will of its people, was compelled to play the role of a military and political pawn. In short, the separation of Okinawa was a product of U.S.–Japanese collaboration, albeit collaboration between somewhat unequal partners.

Planning the Occupation of Okinawa

It is possible to divide the postwar U.S. military administration of Okinawa into three phases: (1) planning, (2) assault or combat, and (3) garrison. The planning phase lasts from the start of planning by the Tenth Army staff in Hawaii until the actual landing of U.S. forces on Okinawa; the second phase runs from March 26, 1945, when the Kerama landing took place, to the end of organized resistance by Japanese forces on June 21; the third phase terminates with the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in May 1972.

The drafting and adoption of plans and policies for the military government of Okinawa began in conjunction with the planning of the Okinawa campaign some time in the summer of 1944. The plans were drawn up by the military affairs section of the Tenth Army, which was the principal force in the Okinawa campaign. This military affairs section was later
transformed into the civil affairs section with headquarters at Schofield Barracks on Oahu Island. Fifteen Navy and four Army officers were dispatched from Washington to plan the military government of Okinawa. Since the Okinawa campaign was to be a joint operation of the Army, Navy, and the Marine Corps, all three shared responsibility for the military government of Okinawa. Therefore, it differed greatly from that for Japan proper in that the actual combat forces involved assumed the central role.

In addition to the military career personnel of the assault unit, former professors and others assisted in the work. About the same time that military government personnel of the Tenth Army were working on the planning, a handbook entitled *The Civil Affairs Handbook: Ryukyu (Loochoo) Islands* was being prepared by Dr. George P. Murdock, a Navy lieutenant commander and former professor of anthropology at Yale University, working with some graduates of Columbia University's Naval School of Military Administration. Similar handbooks were also prepared by the Survey Analysis Department of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), but they were primarily for use in the prefectures of Japan proper.

In addition to the *Civil Affairs Handbook*, a document entitled "*The Okinawa of the Loochoo Islands: A Minority Group in Japan*" was published by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. This is an important source of information on the perception on which U.S. military policy toward Okinawa was based on. While the former describes external condition of Okinawa, the latter focuses on the ways of thinking and behavior of the Okinawans. Many of those who participated in military government activities say that it was very helpful and widely used in the actual administration of the islands. The book consists of three parts; Part 1 analyzes Okinawa's position in the context of Japanese history; Part 2 describes the past and current (1943) living conditions of Okinawan immigrants in Hawaii and touches upon their social and psychological characteristics; and Part 3 clarifies the unique characteristics of Okinawans and Okinawan society. It specifically discusses the possibility of using this knowledge in psychological warfare against the Japanese on the mainland and in Okinawa.

Although space does not permit a close examination of this important document, its basic message is that in any Japanese communities, whether in Hawaii, South America, or the South Seas, the mainland Japanese have always discriminated against and looked down upon Okinawans as not "real" Japanese. The Okinawans, for their part, have always resented such treatment. This Navy document emphasizes the existence of a clear-cut cleavage between the two groups and recommends playing upon this antagonism of the Okinawans to the maximum extent possible to turn the tide of war in favor of the American
forces. In other words, the authors of this document believed that the underlying dislike between them can be readily exploited for psychological warfare purposes in the battlefield and that this cleavage was "a natural phenomenon rooted in ethnological differences."4

The U.S. military acted accordingly in its psychological warfare campaigns against the inhabitants of Okinawa and tried to add fuel to their feelings of estrangement from Japan. Although the existence of "ethnological differences" between Okinawans and people in Japan proper is dubious scientifically, this view was later bluntly reiterated by General MacArthur in regard to the draft of a treaty of peace with Japan on September 1, 1947: "The draft provides for the retention of the Ryukyu Islands by Japan. Control over this group must be vested in the United States as absolutely essential to the defense of our Western Pacific Frontier. It is not indigenous to Japan ethnologically, does not contribute to Japan's economic welfare, nor do the Japanese people expect to be permitted to retain it. It is basically strategic, and in my opinion, failure to secure it for control by the United States might prove militarily disastrous."5

MacArthur's remarks might have been intended to justify a strategy of "divide and rule" for Okinawa. Those who planned U.S. policy toward Japan during the war attempted at one time to start a "free Japan movement" advocated by people like Oyama Ikuo, a noted liberal, and others who lived abroad and were critical of Japanese militarism.6 "The Okinawa of the Loochoo Islands records that the U.S. military actually considered the possibility of promoting a "free Okinawa movement" by mobilizing anti-Japanese Okinawans in South America. According to this document, since 60 percent of the Japanese community in Peru consisted of Okinawans critical of Japanese from the mainland, the "free Okinawa movement" would have a good chance of success if the situation could be skillfully exploited. Furthermore, since Okinawans had had to emigrate abroad because they were conquered, destroyed, and driven from their homeland by mainland Japanese, "a publicity campaign could remind them of their past glories as an independent kingdom as well as their traditional role as the bearer of the great Chinese civilization." The authors of this document also reasoned that if the Okinawans in Hawaii and Brazil could be organized behind a "free Okinawa movement", not only would the nearly 200,000 Okinawans living in Japan proper rise up against the Japanese Empire but the Chinese in Peru and other Latin American countries who were sympathetic to the Okinawans, might also cooperate with them in support of their movement.7

The Establishment of U.S. Military Government

Unlike U.S. occupation policy toward Japan proper, which was put into final form after
specialists from different departments of the government had been duly consulted, the occupation plans for Okinawa seem to have been drafted and put into final form by a combat unit. Strictly speaking, however, the Tenth Army did not do it alone, since its policy making was guided by clearly stated principles. The Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East in Washington on March 21, 1944, issued a document entitled "Japan: Military Occupation: Proclamations (Postwar Programs Committee [PWC]−120", which contains instructions that the United States Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs (Field Manual [FM] 27−5), chapters 35 and 36 of section 6, should be used as a guideline in drafting proclamations concerning the occupation of Japan.8 Judging from their contents, the proclamations issued in Okinawa were guided by this manual.

Moreover, PWC−123, *Japan: Mandated Islands: Status of Military Government*, dated March 22, 1944, discusses the legality of setting up military government and establishing military bases in the mandated territories of the Pacific.9 These arguments were also applied to Okinawa. The document that provided the actual framework for the plan to establish military government in Okinawa, however, was a directive issued by C.W. Nimitz, Commander-Chief, Pacific Ocean Area, dated November 3, 1944. Apparently based on JCS-1231, *Directive for Military Government in the Japanese Outlying Islands*, Nimitz’s directive, *A Proposed Political Directive for Military Government of the Japanese Outlying Islands*, was sent to the Tenth Army on the same day that he was ordered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to secure one or more tactical positions on the Ryukyu Islands.

As soon as the military affairs section of the Tenth Army received Nimitz’s directive, they began to give special training sessions for military government officers to familiarize them with Okinawa. And, in consultations with Section 1 of the General Staff, they started to prepare concrete proposals for the establishments of military government. The actual planning for military government on Okinawa was triggered by a strategic switch from Taiwan to Okinawa— a previously planned attack on Taiwan was canceled. As a result, numerous revisions and last-minute changes had to be made before the plan was finally adopted. The military affairs section is said to have had considerable difficulty because of its low standing within the Command Headquarters. Lieutenant Commander Malcolm S. MacLean, a former professor, who served as head of the military affairs section until mid-November 1944, had originally been involved in planning for the occupation of Taiwan but was then shifted to head the planning for a military government on Okinawa. MacLean soon fell ill, however, and Brigadier General William E. Crist replaced him.10

With the appointment of a general officer as its chief, the Military Affairs Section, which had until then been under Section 1 of the General Staff, became more independent.
It was designated G—5, that is, Section 5 of the General Staff, and had equal ranking with the other major sections in the command Headquarters. In this manner the importance of military government in the overall war strategy finally came to be recognized.

By December 1944 the staff was increased and, reflecting the fact that the Okinawa campaign was a joint Army-Navy operation, the Military Affairs Section was made responsible to both the Army and the Navy. However, rivalries between these two branches caused considerable difficulty, and the Tenth Army military affairs section had to expedite its planning for the Military occupation of Okinawa while simultaneously striving to strike at balance between the two rival branches.

By the end of November the Tenth Army's military Affairs Section had received The Civil Affairs Handbook and The Okinawa of the Loochoo Islands from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. These documents considerably facilitated the work of the Military Affairs Section. In January and February 1945 the Tenth Army Command distributed its Technical Bulletin, which contained the operational directive and general plan of implementation for military government. On March 1, 1945, The Political, Economic and Financial Directive for Military Government in the Occupied Islands of the Nansei Shoto and Adjacent Waters was issued by Chester W. Nimitz, Fleet Admiral, United States Navy, Commander-in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. It was this directive that determined the substance of military government in Okinawa, containing as it does, among other things, the all important Proclamation 1 (popularly known as the Nimitz Proclamation).

It was on the basis of this directive that the military government of Okinawa was established at the same time as the operational strategy against Okinawa was being developed and carried out. In this respect the occupation of Okinawa was inherently different from the occupation of Japan proper.

What were the aims of this early military government? The answer is found in a radio broadcast beamed to the United States by Brigadier General William Crist, the man responsible for the military government project and, after the landing, Deputy Commander for Military Government, Okinawa. Crist explained: "The first aim of the military government is to make it possible for combat units to concentrate on the war without having to worry about non-combat personnel." Along with the paramount aim, Crist said, "the military government will take measures to provide the minimum relief needed for civilian survival under international law," and he added that he wanted to "minimize the economic burden on the United States by promoting economic self-sufficiency in the occupied territory."
In short, the basic purpose of military government on Okinawa was to accomplish military ends at minimum cost to the United States. To realize that purpose it adopted a harsh policy as reflected in Crist's blunt remark: "We have no intention of playing Santa Claus for the residents of the occupied territory." Such a policy might be understandable under wartime conditions, but it was characteristic of military government on Okinawa that it continued this harsh policy even after the war. For example, military government tried to separate the Amami Oshima Islands, Miyako Islands, and Yaeyama Islands from Okinawa because of their uselessness as military bases and the costs of administering them.

Military government on Okinawa, based on the principle that military rule should be effected in such a manner as to minimize the financial burden on the United States, not only worked against the interests of the local residents but also hampered the activities for the military government staff. Its difficulties were by no means limited to a lack of food, clothing, and shelter. For instance, the confusion that surfaced in the command arrangements for military government on Okinawa had dire consequences. While the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1943 had assigned Admiral Nimitz responsibility for capturing the small islands in the Pacific and establishing military government over them, the larger land masses were assigned to the Supreme Commander of the Southwest Pacific Area, General MacArthur. Supreme authority was thereby divided according to the geographic features of the area, with both MacArthur and Nimitz in command of the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force in late July 1945 on the very eve of the assault on Japan Proper, when Nimitz was given command of the entire Navy in the Pacific region and MacArthur command of the Army in the same region. In addition, the tactical air force was newly established as a combat unit on an equal footing with the Army and Navy with General Carl A. Spaatz at its head, and all three branches were brought under the direct command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In short, when faced with the climactic invasion of Japan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff attempted to unify the command channels.

But in Okinawa, which was on the receiving end of this command channel, the changes at the top caused only confusion. Moreover, the rapid demobilization following Japan's surrender added to the confusion in the military government. Space does not permit a detailed treatment of the problem, but there was a bewildering transfer of military government control between the Army and the Navy, illustrated by the fact that the U.S. occupation of Okinawa had some 22 different individuals at its head during 27 years of military government. It was thus impossible even to hope for consistency in government policies (particularly in civil affairs), let alone to think of formulating any long-range
economic policy for Okinawa. As noted by those who actually ran the military government, this situation was in part caused by the United States government and in part by General MacArthur's indifference toward Okinawa.

On June 21, 1945, the United States announced that the Japanese forces on Okinawa had ended their organized resistance and that Okinawa had been secured. With the fall of Okinawa, control of military government was transferred to the Island Command. Considering that the original function of the Island Command was to care for non-combat personnel and to supply them with goods, the transfer meant that responsibility for running the military government on Okinawa was finally placed in the right hands.

When the Island Command, also called the Army Garrison Forces, assumed complete control, military government on Okinawa entered its third or garrison phase. The new situation, however, was worse than in the combat phase. In addition to haphazard and makeshift policies resulting from confusion in the military government command channels, the situation also deteriorated because local military government specialists were being rapidly discharged. There was an especially costly departure of former university professors and others who had been involved in Okinawa's military government from the planning stages. Not all of their successors took their responsibilities seriously. The military government came to be dominated by people who had neither sympathy for nor understanding of military government, people who were simply killing time until their tours of duty ended. Their presence had most adverse effects on the Okinawan's perception of the United States. Thus, Okinawa soon became notorious even among Americans as "the logistical end of the line", "a Botany Bay for bad bureaucrats and colonels," or "a 'dumping ground' or place of exile for American personnel unwanted at GHQ in Japan Proper." Harlan Youel, who worked with the military government on Okinawa's economic recovery, states that within the command hierarchy Okinawa was placed under the jurisdiction of the Ryukyu Command (RYCOM), which was under the Philippine-Ryukyu Command (PHLRYCOM), which in turn was under the Far East Command (FEC). Youel goes on to say that it was common practice for undesirables and useless individuals in the Far East Command to be sent to the Philippine-Ryukyu Command, and for the dregs of the Philippine—Ryukyu Command to be sent to the Ryukyu Command.

Under these circumstances, it did not take long for military government on Okinawa to slip into a period of what George Kerr has termed "indifferences." This state of indifference on the part of the U.S. government and military lasted until the end of 1949, when the program for transforming Okinawa into a permanent military base went into high gear. This led to a gradual change in U.S. policy toward the residents of Okinawa. Until then,
however, as we have seen, numerous problems beset the military governments: (1) lack of trained personnel, (2) lack of communication between U.S. military personnel and local residents caused by lack of common language, (3) confusion caused by the division of authority between the Army and Navy, (4) ambiguity over the ultimate political status of the Ryukyus, and (5) lack of essential provisions and equipment. After noting these problems, Leonard Weiss, who had been directly involved in running the military government, concludes that these negative factors combined to make the military government a total failure—a view widely shared by those familiar with the situation in Okinawa.

Thus far, we have briefly summarized the problems that beset the men who ran the military government. Let us now turn to the military government as seen by the local inhabitants.

**Changes in Okinawan Views of the United States**

It was obvious that the long-term success of the U.S. military government would depend largely on how the residents of the occupied territory reacted. From the standpoint of the residents, as long as the occupation policy toward Okinawa, unlike that toward Japan, did not aim at "democratic reform," the suitability of the actual policy was of secondary importance to the military occupation itself. Besides questioning its legality, Okinawans had doubts about its political and humanitarian aspects. People resented the fact that Okinawa was the only part of the Japanese Empire, aside from the northern territories, to be detached and placed under foreign military forces. They were not satisfied with justifications such as "Japan lost the war," "tension persists in the Far East," or "there is a need to ensure the security of the United States and Japan including Okinawa."

Many residents of Okinawa, having been completely brainwashed by anti-U.S. propaganda before the American landing, naïvely believed that capture by American troops would mean instant death for men and rape followed by death for women. Indeed, the brainwashing was so thorough that some 700 old people, women, and children actually committed mass suicide rather than be captured when U.S. forces landed on the Keramas. By contrast, practically all those who were rescued from the horrors of war by American troops were astonished and gratified at the way the American soldiers treated them. Their treatment was completely different from what they had been taught to expect. It was altogether human for Okinawans to feel deeply indebted to the Americans who had saved their lives and who had provided them with food, shelter, and clothing even in the midst of war. It was particularly so since many of the Japanese troops had not only acted thoughtlessly, but in not a few cases had indiscriminately committed atrocities. Among the Japanese soldiers were those who
claimed to be protecting the residents but who actually stole food, who chased residents out of places of refuge so that they could have them to themselves, who massacred innocent natives on groundless charges such as spying, and who otherwise acted most brutally toward those local residents who had sacrificed everything they had to the war effort.

The Okinawans were the more moved by the Americans' kindness by comparison, and the Japanese soldiers were more feared than the Americans. The U.S. forces quickly launched a psychological campaign to take advantage of this situation and to alienate the local residents from Japan by playing up every atrocity committed by the Japanese troops.

Directive 1, which the Tenth Army promulgated on May 3, 1945, as a guideline for the officers and men in charge of military government, illustrates this with instructions that "the military government staff shall deal firmly with the residents, but must at the same time avoid cruel and incompassionate acts which would only lower them to the level of the Japanese forces." Nevertheless, the Okinawans were extremely friendly and cooperative toward the U.S. military at the beginning of the military government but not because U.S. propaganda was effective but rather-and more importantly—because the people caught up in the war had no choice but to rely upon the American soldiers for their very survival.

Unlike some Okinawan intellectuals (particularly those critical of the establishment), who at first considered the U.S. military an army of liberation, the average Okinawan learned through direct contacts on the battlefield to accept the Americans on an emotional level as friendly people. In fact, unlike the intellectuals, who measured the military government against the principles of democracy, the average man reacted toward the United States in terms of what benefitted him most in his daily life. But this initially positive popular opinion, based as it was on emotion and pragmatism, could be easily swayed by a change in the situation. Thus, the masses were rapidly disillusioned by onset of confusion and indifference within the U.S. military government. Moreover, although the attitude of the Okinawan people toward the United States shifted from "favorable" to "unfavorable" seemingly as a result of the everyday behavior of the U.S. troops, this change was inevitable sooner or later, given the essential nature of military government.

Time after time, the U.S. military authorities declared that they would turn Okinawa into "a showcase of democracy." But for the staff of the military government, charged with the task of building a major base in the Pacific, trying to democratize Okinawa was like trying to square a circle. Under the rationale of turning Okinawa into a permanent base, U.S. military expropriated land in a manner that defied description.
For the Okinawans who live on it, land is never a mere plot of dirt. Frequently, it is something precious, something they can always fall back for their ancestors. It is insurance, something they can always fall back on to eke out a subsistence. Since the U.S. military ruthlessly expropriated the land at bayonet point or even by using tanks from time to time, it is no wonder that popular attitudes toward the United States were reversed. There were times when people were not even paid for their land, and times when bulldozers leveled houses and cultural treasures that had somehow survived the war.\textsuperscript{26} As these and other similar acts showing a complete disregard for the people's feelings became more frequent, the American troops were inevitably compared to the Japanese troops who had acted so ruthlessly during the war. Under such circumstances, it was only natural that the people should come to look upon the United States not as a liberator but as an oppressor as the military moved to turn Okinawa (beginning with the most important central areas) into a vast military base. This anti-American antagonism against the U.S. military for usurping the land was further aggravated when the military government took possession of 51 percent of the stocks of the Bank of the Ryukyus and took over the management of key local economic organizations such as water resources, electricity, and public finance corporations.\textsuperscript{27} Furthermore we should not overlook the fact that turning Okinawa into a military base completely changed the traditional local economy and created an economic structure utterly dependent upon the military bases.

Even in its broad outlines, then, it is clear that the occupation of Okinawa was completely different from the occupation in Japan Proper. However, the Okinawan people worked on their own initiative for a "democratic reform" despite the separate rule imposed by Article 3 of the treaty between Japan and the victorious powers, an article that even Prime Minister Kishi had to admit in his Diet testimony, was of a legally dubious nature despite the fact that Okinawa was thereby placed outside the scope of the Japanese constitution.\textsuperscript{28} It is worth mentioning that the reforms that the people of Okinawa achieved were different from the "democratic reforms" of Japan Proper. It is one of history's ironies that, by serving as a "negative model", the U.S. occupation forces helped the Okinawan people achieve self-reliance—something they had never had before.

By the same token, the undemocratic situation in Okinawa had the unexpected effect of calling into question the real significance of the "postwar reforms" in Japan Proper. What is one to think of a Japanese government willing to detach part of its own territory and cede it to foreign military rule in blind pursuit of its own narrow interests? Questioning such heartless acts, one Japanese constitutional scholar has stated: "To the extent that the Japanese constitution permits the security arrangements with the U.S., it cannot but be
inadequate as the constitution of an independent country. The most visible consequence of this flaw is the presence of U.S. military bases on Okinawa and elsewhere, for neither the Japanese constitution nor the sovereign will of the Japanese people can exert any influence inside these bases."

**Okinawa's Separation and "Postwar Reform" Policy toward Japan**

In order to examine the relationship between the postwar policy toward Japan and the separation of Okinawa from Japan, it is necessary to trace the two policies back to their planning and drafting stages. With regard to Okinawa’s detachment, it is useful to analyze the process in terms of both military strategy and political objectives, since detachment became inevitable when the military and political exigencies converged and the Japanese government simultaneously supported it.

In early 1942 the United States began drafting the terms of Japanese surrender. Later, in August 1942, after Japan had been defeated in the battle of Midway, the United States began deliberating the question of Japan’s postsurrender territorial boundaries. At about the same time China declared that it would demand the return of the Ryukyus, Manchuria, and Taiwan. Shortly afterward, in October and November, the drafting of postwar policy toward Japan accelerated, but it was not until the beginning of 1943 that the problem of Okinawa came up. It is noteworthy that demands portending Okinawa’s detachment appeared at about the same time the substantive work on postwar policy toward Japan Proper began.

Following the March 1943 establishment of the Civil Affairs Department (CAD) within the Department of the Army, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, directly responsible to the President, began to involve themselves in the problem of establishing military governments on enemy soil. This concern affected equally Okinawa and Japan Proper, although it was to have a particularly strong influence on the future of Okinawa. When the Allied forces captured the Solomon Islands in August 1943, U.S. policy toward Japan began to assume concrete and clear form, and the United States’ plan to detach Okinawa from Japan Proper began to crystallize.

The Cairo Conference in November 1943 was a fateful turning point for Okinawa, for it signalled important changes both militarily and politically. On the military level, while Churchill and Roosevelt were determining the timetable for the Pacific War, they also discussed Okinawa as one of their strategic targets. On the political level, Roosevelt and
Chiang Kai-shek had dinner together during the Conference and exchanged ideas on some ten topics, including China’s international status, the treatment of Japan’s Imperial Family and the problem of Okinawa. Roosevelt asked Chiang whether China wanted the Ryukyus under joint U.S.-Sino occupation and, later, under a mandate controlled by an international organization with a joint U.S.-Sino administration. This episode cannot be taken lightly in its bearing upon Okinawa’s detachment. A President’s statements and thinking can have an enormous influence on American foreign policy, and Roosevelt’s personal diplomacy is said to have been particularly decisive at Cairo.

Thus if it was true that Roosevelt saw Okinawa not as integral part of Japan but as a territory destined to be separated from Japan Proper, such a view could have easily served as the basis for fundamental U.S. policy toward Okinawa.

In fact, there is no reason to believe that Roosevelt’s views failed to affect the decision-making process. The Cairo Conference is particularly important in connection with Okinawa because the Cairo Declaration released just after the conference is closely tied to the Potsdam Declaration and to Article 3 of the Peace Treaty between Japan and the Allied Forces. The Cairo Declaration states that “Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence or greed” (emphasis added unless noted otherwise). To this, the Potsdam Declaration adds, “The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we determine.” It is commonly believed that Okinawa was not included among the Cairo Declaration’s “territories which she has taken by violence or greed” and was included among the Potsdam Declaration’s “such minor islands as we determine.” While some scholars disagree on the latter point, both the Japanese and U.S. governments took the position that Okinawa was included among the “minor islands” in the Potsdam Declaration. While there is no really clear and authoritative statement as to the Japanese attitude on the Cairo Declaration, it is at least possible to speculate that at some point the four heads of state may have looked upon Okinawa as a territory that Japan had annexed by force. Such speculation is reasonable because even the Soviet Union, which later came out against the separation of Okinawa, went along with the other Allied Powers at the Pacific War Conference of January 1944; and Stalin, having been thoroughly briefed on the history of the Ryukyus, told Roosevelt that he would agree if China wanted the Ryukyus back.

There is no clear statement concerning the Ryukyus in the Cairo Declaration, just as there was later to be none in the Potsdam Declaration, because vagueness was politically preferable at that stage. As for the Potsdam Declaration, even though both Japan and the
United States later stated that Okinawa was included as a "minor island," the noted specialist in international law, Kisaburo Yokota, for instance, says that Okinawa was not included because the term "minor islands" meant those islands in the vicinity of Japan's four major islands, thus Okinawa did not come under Japanese jurisdiction. The present writer agrees that Okinawa was not included simply because the crucial U.S. secret documents cited previously indicate that Okinawa was not included at first because the military influence was sufficient to exclude it, but it was later included because U.S. policy changed during the conclusion of the peace treaty and because Okinawa was used as bait to draw Japan into the American camp. There is, in fact, evidence that the United States at the beginning adopted a policy that did not recognize Okinawa as belonging to Japan.

The Cairo Conference is also important because the concept discussed by Chiang Kai-shek and Roosevelt, that the United States and China share administrative authority in Okinawa under the trusteeship of an international organization, was later embodied in Article 3 of the Peace Treaty, unaltered except for China's role. Although it is not clear how influential Chiang Kai-shek's opinion was, it was at least an important bit of background. In other words, although most scholars have ignored the Cairo Conference because it does not contain any explicit reference to Okinawa, the historical importance of the Cairo Conference for Okinawa is clear.

In July 1943, prior to the Cairo Conference, the Territorial Subcommittee of the U.S. State Department drafted a document proposing U.S. policy toward Okinawa that was independent of policy toward Japan. After going out of its way to refer to Okinawa by its old name as the "Liuchiu" (Ryukyu) Islands, the document points out that the question of detaching the Ryukyus from Japan would be included in the forthcoming discussions of postwar territorial arrangements in the Far East and establishes 30° N as the line of demarcation. The document then discusses the history of Japan's acquisition of Okinawa and notes that the local Okinawan people strongly resent the appointment of people from the other Japanese prefectures to all appointive positions in the prefectural government. Given this historical background, the document then presents for consideration three concrete policies as alternative solutions: (1) transfer to China, (2) international administration, and (3) conditional retention by Japan.

As far as this writer has been able to discover, this is the earliest document to deal with policy toward Okinawa. It is safe to conclude that the detachment of Okinawa was modelled after the alternative policies it presents. It can also be surmised that this document influenced the Cairo Conference. Since the document refers to the fact that China had demanded the Ryukyus return on several occasions even before the Cairo Conference, it can be argued that
Roosevelt was at least in part responding to this when he asked Chiang Kai-shek if he wanted Okinawa. In addition, the Cairo Declaration was drafted by the Regional Committee and the Territorial Subcommittee, which had participated in drafting this document.

Furthermore, this document is interesting in that it reveals the real aim involved in the separation of Okinawa. It also provides partial support for this writer's hypothesis that the postwar reforms of Japan Proper were drafted and adopted on the premise of Okinawa's detachment. The document reasons that, since Japan would be defeated, disarmed, and deprived of its territories in Taiwan, Korea, and other mandated regions, Japan would not pose an immediate threat to other countries even if it were to retain Okinawa; but it might pose a long-term threat if it did so. Thus before Japan could be allowed to retain Okinawa, certain restrictions needed to be established to ensure that Okinawa would never again be used for military purposes. Periodic inspections of Okinawa by an international body over a long time could provide such assurance. Those who viewed the long-term threat as serious argued that future international security demanded that Japan be completely disarmed and Okinawa either be placed under the surveillance of an international body or be detached from Japan.

But why would Japan constitute a threat if it retained Okinawa? Although the said document does not make direct reference to this question, there are clear statements concerning this point in other records. Simply stated, the justification for this argument is that Japan did, in fact, use Okinawa and the islands under its mandated rule as stepping stones for attacks on other nations. This is also the reason why Okinawa is always discussed in the same context as the mandated islands under Japanese control.

As is generally known, those who drafted U.S. occupation policy toward Japan were anxious to make full use of the lessons learned from the Versailles Peace Treaty. In poring over voluminous documentations, this writer has been most impressed by United States regrets that Japan had been given free rein in the territories under its mandated control. This free rein is referred to as one of the most important causes of World War II. The United States clearly felt that Japan used Okinawa and the regions under its mandated rule as staging points from which it ultimately threatened U.S. security. As John Emmerson has pointed out, the United States began to take an interest in Pacific bases after World War I when the League of Nations gave Japan a mandate over these islands. Ever since, the U.S. military have wanted never again to permit foreign powers, particularly Japan, to threaten the United States and other countries by ruling and fortifying Okinawa and other Pacific islands of strategic importance.

Although it is not possible here to analyze the basis of the Americans insistence that
Japan would again become a threat if it were allowed to retain Okinawa, one historical fact must be cited. In the Meiji period, the Japanese government forced through the so-called Ryukyu disposition to consolidate Japan’s boundaries under the excuse that "in the past, as a neighbor of Japan and China, the Ryukyu han (fief) was given protection by Japan while taking orders from the Emperor of China. Thus it was never clear which country the Ryukyu han belonged to." After carrying out the "disposition," the Meiji government announced: "It goes without saying that the Ryukyu han is geographically, traditionally, linguistically, and historically part of Japan."

However, no sooner had this announcement been made than the Japanese government proposed its notorious "bunto kaiyaku" (cut up the islands and revise the treaty). Under this proposal, the Japanese government intended to offer China the Miyako and Yaeyama islands in the southern Ryukyus in return for commercial privileges within China. In other words, the Japanese government proposed to pursue its economic interests by partitioning territory that it had just annexed and obtain in return for most-favored-nation treatment in its trade with China. History shows, however, that the real significance of this move lay elsewhere.

While the "bunto kaiyaku" proposal came to naught, the Chinese Minister to Japan, Li Hung-chang, in a memorandum written to Ho Ju-chang during his negotiations with the Japanese accurately predicted that once Japan had absorbed the Ryukyus, it would then invade Korea, Taiwan, and eventually China. What comes to mind in this connection is the point made by Ding Ming-nan in postwar Chinese Imperialism: Its History of Violence. The author considered the 1879 abolition of Okinawa’s fief status and its establishment as a prefecture as an act of "annexation" and pointed out that it was the first important step in Japan’s foreign aggression against Korea and the Chinese mainland. Another author referred to the "bunto kaiyaku" proposal in the following manner:

The Japanese plan was a very serious plot. The plot was to cut up the Ryukyus and to bribe the Ching Dynasty with the two most barren groups of islands into recognizing Japan’s annexation of the Ryukyus. Another important point is that Japan wanted to take advantage of this opportunity to further its ambition of invading China by obtaining a foothold in China identical to those which the imperialistic nations of the West had already achieved. Thus this plan integrated Japan’s hopes to annex the Ryukyus and to invade China.
Thus there was historical justification for considering Japan's retention of Okinawa as a threat. Even apart from this, the various records available indicate that it was actually proposed during the course of drawing up the policy toward Japan that the earlier plan to place Okinawa under international surveillance be continued for 25 to 30 years to ensure Japan's complete disarmament. In short, it must be borne in mind that, although the policy calling for Okinawa's separation was drafted and adopted independently of the policy toward Japan, the two were closely interrelated nearly from the beginning. In addition, the previously noted document by the Territorial Subcommittee of the U.S. State Department states that, while the Okinawans were bitterly resentful toward the Japanese, it was inconceivable that they would welcome the prospect of being placed under Chinese rule. This view doubtless influenced the policy toward Okinawa that was finally adopted and may well be one of the reasons the concept of transferring Okinawa to China was dropped.

In the final analysis, there is no denying that the separation of Okinawa was conceived well before the beginning of the Okinawa campaign and implemented as soon as the fighting commenced. The purposes of the separation were (1) to establish a base from which to invade Japan proper, (2) to use Okinawa as a monitoring station from which to ensure that Japan abided by the surrender terms of the Potsdam Declaration, and (3) to prevent Japan's rearmament and ensure that Japan would not again pose a threat to the security of the United States and other countries.

Concerning the first of these aims, MacArthur, just after he captured Manila, declared that Tokyo would be his next target and that Okinawa was the natural invasion bridge for the attack on Tokyo. Indeed, the work of turning Okinawa into a base started as the U.S. troops landed on Okinawa. It is important to keep in mind that MacArthur, who assumed complete control of Okinawa in July 1945, consistently adhered to the idea that the United States should have sole control of Okinawa.

The second objective is the main focus of this paper. The present writer views the separation of Okinawa as, among other things, a precondition for the postwar reforms of disarmament, demilitarization, and democratization in Japan Proper. One quick way to prove this point is to ask if the Allied forces stationed in Japan Proper were sufficient to enforce the terms of surrender. In other words, it was perhaps necessary to transform Okinawa into a monitoring base in order to disarm and demilitarize Japan Proper as one of the two pillars of postwar reforms. According to available records, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and MacArthur at first lamented the lack of occupation troops.

Before the occupation it was estimated that there were 2.5 million Japanese troops in Japan Proper and about the same number abroad. By contrast, there were about 1.8 million
U.S. troops in the planned occupation force. Although United Nations forces were to be sent to help, this was little consolation because 1.5 million U.S. troops were scheduled to return home by the middle of 1946. Even though this was sufficient Allied strength to carry out the earlier phases of the occupation, U.S. government leaders shared a belief that it would be necessary to retain U.S. bases in the vicinity of Japan Proper to prevent rebellion and the like.\(^{48}\) Since the actual number of occupation troops was only 117,580,\(^{49}\) MacArthur termed occupied Japan a "military vacuum" and requested reinforcements. Moreover, in order to establish his historical role in the postwar reforms, MacArthur strongly urged that all occupation troops be withdrawn from Japan Proper once the treaty was concluded. The more MacArthur was committed to the demilitarization of Japan Proper, the more inevitable it was that Okinawa should be detached. He also emphasized that the position of the United States in Asia would be seriously jeopardized if it relinquished Okinawa. It is therefore easy to understand why MacArthur echoed Perry in proclaiming that Okinawans are not Japanese and that they would be happy under the United States's rule.\(^{50}\) Since few studies have dealt with MacArthur's role in the detachment of Okinawa, this should certainly be an important subject for future research.

In conclusion, there is no denying that Japanese government since the Meiji era has seen Okinawa not as an indispensable part of Japan but rather as a tool to be used in pursuit of Japan's (i.e., Japan Proper's) interests. That the Japanese government conceived the defense of Okinawa as a necessary sacrifice to delay the assault on Japan proper and thus willfully caused the death of approximately 170,000 Okinawans, or more than one-third of the island's total population, but has never reflected upon the gravity of this act is only one example of its basic attitude toward Okinawa. Just before the Potsdam Declaration was put into effect, the Japanese government made several proposals regarding its provisions, among which were requests to have the occupation forces stationed away from Tokyo, to have only a symbolic occupation, and to have food and medicine sent to the Imperial Japanese forces stranded on Pacific islands. Not only did the Japanese government make no request on behalf of Okinawans caught in the horrors of the war but, at least as far as American records indicate, it did not even take notice of a telegram that Ambassador Saito sent from Moscow after he had heard the terms of the Potsdam Declaration on the radio expressing concern that Okinawa might not be included among the "minor islands" belonging to Japan.

Far from acknowledging the telegram, the records show that Fumimaro Konoe's draft of conditions for the peace negotiations with the United States and England indicates his willingness to have Okinawa, Ogasawara, and Karafuto excluded from Japanese "national territory".\(^{51}\) Moreover, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida asserted before the peace negotia-
tions that Japan would not be opposed to leasing Okinawa to the United States and England under the so-called Bermuda formula for ninety-nine years. Right after the Peace Treaty went into effect, a well-known scholar in Japan Proper expressed appreciation for the way the occupation of Japan had been carried out in that, unlike Germany and Korea, neither the Japanese homeland nor people were divided. Both of these views reveal that Okinawa was not considered as an integral part of Japan and symbolize the Japanese attitude toward Okinawa. It is thus no exaggeration to say that, contrary to the widely held belief that the detachment of Okinawa was an unavoidable consequence of Japan’s having lost the war and accepted the surrender terms of the Potsdam Declaration, its detachment was actually the consequence of a joint effort (direct and indirect) by the governments of Japan and the United States acting in their respective national interests.

Toward the end of the Pacific war, Okinawa became the first—and last—field of ground warfare in Japan. Japanese strategists essentially sacrificed Okinawa to free more resources for the defense of the Japanese mainland. Okinawans were dragged into a losing battle, which reduced almost the whole Ryukyu chain to ruins. Citizens, who should have been protected to the last, were the first to die; even girl students were sent into battle. More than 150,000 islanders—about one third of the entire population at that time—were killed. The number of Japanese regulars killed there was less than half that number.

Hardly surprising, then, are the results of a recent NHK poll: Only 11 percent of 900 Okinawans surveyed saw the battle for Okinawa as unavoidable from the standpoint of national defense. Eighty-two percent considered it reckless and involving tremendous sacrifices for the Okinawans.

The battle of Okinawa inflicted deep wounds on the minds of the local people, which still twinge each time something happens to bring back old memories. The Okinawan’s way of seeing things, thinking, and living was irreversibly changed by the war. The harsh assessment of the extent of the emperor’s war responsibility is one reflection of this change.

The "Emperor’s Message" and Transformation of Okinawa into Military Base

On June 6, 1945, toward the end of the battle of Okinawa, Rear Admiral Ōta Minoru sent what was his last official telegram to the vice minister of the navy. In it he said the Okinawans were giving their unstinted cooperation to the Japanese forces defending the island despite cruel losses. The last clause read: "The Okinawans have fought well. Please
give them special consideration in the future.” Then Ota committed suicide.

In the event, the Japanese government ignored Ota’s final request; it disregarded the Okinawan sacrifices and, on the contrary, gave the islands over to alien military occupation to gain Japanese independence. At the 1952 peace conference in San Francisco, even though 72 percent of all Okinawans of voting age had signed a petition saying they wanted Okinawa to revert to Japan, the Japanese government ignored the submitted petition and failed even to suggest the islands’ return. The emperor did not refer to Okinawa in his remarks welcoming the peace treaty; Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, head of the Japanese delegation at the peace conference, did not refer to Okinawa in his memoirs. The islanders were not covered by the Peace Constitution, adopted in 1947, until the reversion to Japan. Thus, though Okinawans were shocked when the “emperor’s message” was disclosed nine years ago, they could hardly have been astonished. Their homeland had been rejected and excluded many times before.

Two letters in the National Archives in Washington, D.C., concern this message allegedly from Emperor Hirohito regarding the future status of the Ryukyu Islands. Terasaki Hidenari, an adviser to the emperor, conveyed the message to William J. Sebald, U.S. political adviser for Japan, and Sebald reported it in his letters to Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and to the U.S. secretary of state on Sept. 20 and 22, 1947, respectively. There is no knowing whether the message originated with the emperor or whether it was delivered on his initiative, but it is clear from the records that it was carefully examined on the U.S. side for reliability.

The following is an excerpt from Sebald’s communication to MacArthur.

Mr. Terasaki stated that the Emperor hopes that the United States will continue the military occupation of Okinawa and other islands of the Ryukyus. In the Emperor's opinion, such occupation would benefit the United States and also provide protection for Japan. The Emperor feels that such a move would meet with widespread approval among the Japanese people who fear not only the menace of Russia, but after the Occupation has ended, the growth of rightist and leftist groups which might give rise to an "incident" which Russia could use as a basis for interfering internally in Japan.

The Emperor further feels that United States military occupation of Okinawa (and such other islands as may be required) should be based upon the fiction of a long-term lease—25 to 50 years or more—with sovereignty retained in Japan. According to the Emperor, this method of occupation would convince the Japanese people that the United States has no permanent designs on the Ryukyu Islands, and other nations, particularly Soviet Russia and China, would thereby be estopped from demanding similar rights.
Sebald goes on to tell about a proposal made by Terasaki himself.

As to procedure, Mr. Terasaki felt that the acquisition of "military base rights" (of Okinawa and other islands in the Ryukyus) should be by bilateral treaty between the United States and Japan rather than form part of the Allied peace treaty with Japan.

Sebald's letter to the secretary of state was a cover letter for the enclosed "copy of a self-explanatory memorandum for General MacArthur" and summarizes the emperor's "opinion."

How strong an influence the emperor's message had on American policy in Okinawa is debatable, but that there was some influence cannot, I think, be denied. George Kennan, director of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department at the time, side in a policy document for discussion:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur have indicated that it is essential to U.S. security that the U.S. retain effective control over the islands of the Ryukyu archipelago. The Policy Planning Staff has been given to understand by Army and Navy representatives that the most recent military thinking is that U.S. control need be exercised over only those islands south of Latitude 29° and that such control should be in the form of a strategic trusteeship.

The Policy Planning Staff accepts the principle of U.S. control over the southern Ryukyus. It has now, however, seen convincing evidence that a strategic trusteeship would be, in all around terms, the most satisfactory form of U.S. control. The Staff notes that the Emperor of Japan has been represented as suggesting that the U.S. should continue military occupation of Okinawa and such other islands as may be required on the basis of a long-term lease—25 to 50 year or more— with sovereignty retained by Japan. The Staff feels that this formula might well be explored as an alternative to strategic trusteeship. (PPS/10/1, Oct. 15, 1947, Emphasis added)

In that the State Department abandoned the strategic trusteeship the military recommended, the emperor's message can be judged to have affected U.S. policy toward Okinawa. It seems to me, however, that the emperor's message was an answer of sorts to MacArthur, who sent a telegram expressing his wishes to the State Department before he received the emperor's message. In the telegram he states in part:

The draft (of the Peace Treaty) provides for the retention of the Ryukyu Islands by Japan. Control over this group must be vested in the
United States as absolutely essential to the defense of our Western Pacific Frontier. It is not indigenous to Japan ethnologically, does not contribute to Japan's economic welfare, nor do the Japanese people expect to be permitted to retain it. It is basically strategic, and in my opinion, failure to secure it for control by the United States might prove militarily disastrous. (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Vol. 6, P. 512)

This suggests that the emperor might well have conceived the ideas or suggestions that resulted in his message during his repeated meetings with MacArthur. At this time the emperor's status was in jeopardy, and he was fully aware that sending such a message to MacArthur could help secure his position. As Sebald said in the Sept. 22 letter to the U.S. secretary of state mentioned earlier, the emperor's message conveyed "a hope which undoubtedly is largely based upon self interest."

The public had no knowledge of the emperor's message until Shindo Eiichi, an associate professor at Tsukuba University, quoted it in the April 1979 issue of the monthly journal Sekai. Okinawans were so wounded by the disclosure that it canceled out in their minds all the benefits of assistance provided by the Japanese government up to that time. Those who had lost relatives in a war fought for the nation and the emperor could not but see the enforced wartime sacrifices in a new light. Some began to speak bitterly of their lot as members of a minority group within Japan. Little wonder the emperor's message is a common topic of debate even today.

**The Poorest Prefecture**

Okinawa has changed remarkably since the end of the war, particularly since the reversion to Japan. Airports, harbors, roads, sewerage, and public buildings have been vastly improved, and the main streets are lined with high-rise buildings. The population has increased to nearly 1.2 million, and to all appearances Okinawa is far better off than ever before.

Not to be ignored, though, is the fact that Okinawa has been incorporated into Japan's political, economic, educational, and cultural establishment and as a result has lost its cultural identity. Moreover, it is still heavily dependent upon the U.S. bases for jobs. Over the years the Japanese government has passed many special measures to assist Okinawa, pouring trillions of yen into redevelopment projects. A highway between Nago and Naha City was recently opened and a huge convention hall completed. But according to a local newspaper, about 83 percent of the capital invested thus far has flowed back to the mainland headquarters of the more than 500 large companies that have built branch offices in Okinawa.
Little has seeped into the prefectural economy. Yearly per capita income had risen to ¥1.5 million by 1984, yet this is only 74 percent of the nation's average. And while even 74 percent may sound good compared to the figure (60 percent) for 1972, the year Okinawa was returned to Japan, the southernmost prefecture still remains the poorest of the 47 in the country.

The working population of Okinawa is up to 509,000, from 453,000 in 1980. But the unemployment rate is 5.6 percent, twice as high as the nation's average (2.7 percent) and little improved since 1972. In fact, the jobless rate is growing among the prefecture's younger generation, those in their 20s and 30s.

"Our effort to bridge the gap between Okinawa and the rest of the country is bearing fruit," announced Watanuki Tamisuke, then director-general of the Okinawa Development Agency of the Japanese government, after his latest visit to Okinawa. "Every city mayor, town head, and village chief I met there said that Okinawa's return to Japan has been successful. The infrastructure is now being improved in preparation for the athletic meet. My staff and I will do our best to promote the further development of Okinawa." It is ironic that the meet he pointed to as a catalyst of progress drew attention to the prefecture's poor-relation status and aroused dormant local disagreements.

The 100-member Committee for Peace, organized by Okinawan scholars and cultural leaders, recently made an announcement, on the 15th anniversary of the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, that called attention to seven major problems the prefecture now faces. One is that increasing political and economic subordination to the mainland is weakening communal solidarity and causing Okinawa to lose its cultural and spiritual uniqueness, the product of its special historical and cultural background. Another thing that worries the committee is the buildup of U.S. military and Japanese Self-Defense Force bases in Okinawa and its implications for response to emergencies under the Japan-U.S. security system. A third concern is the recent moves of the national government toward educational centralization, as symbolized by attempts to enforce the raising of the national flag at Okinawan schools and the singing of "Kimigayo" (His Majesty's Reign), Japan's de facto national anthem, while trying to exclude the description of the battle of Okinawa from textbooks. Critics claim that these efforts represent a challenge to democracy in education.

Growing Social Distance toward Mainland-Japan

In early September 1987 the Asahi Shimbun and the Okinawa Times conducted a joint
survey asking 1,000 Okinawans, 74.9 percent of whom gave valid responses, for their views on major issues such as those mentioned above. The following is an outline, based on this survey, of what the local people thought about selected issues.

Asked how they viewed the athletic meet, the largest proportion of respondents, 30 percent, said that it presented a good opportunity for making Okinawa better understood. Twenty-seven percent expected to see better roads and sports facilities as a result, and 18 percent thought it would help promote sports.

The emperor's visit was welcomed by 57 percent of Okinawans and opposed by only 11 percent. Twenty-nine percent replied that it was "hard to say" whether the visit was a good thing or not. About 62 percent were either "greatly" or "to some degree" interested in an imperial visit, as they expected the emperor to have some message for the people of Okinawa, including, they hoped, an apology for Okinawa's wartime sufferings. Thirty-six percent had "no interest" in a visit.

What did Okinawans want the emperor to see while in their prefecture? Most (55 percent) said "old battle sites." Also mentioned were "urban growth" and "beautiful natural landscapes" (10 percent each).

Ten percent more Okinawans (47 percent) said they felt "no special closeness" to the imperial family than said they did (37 percent). Although this is partly because Okinawa spent 27 years under foreign rule, there is no denying that governmental and imperial responsibility for the battle of Okinawa also did much to color their perceptions.

As for Okinawan's feelings toward Emperor Hirohito himself, a far larger proportion (54 percent) said they felt "nothing in particular" than expressed respect (23 percent) or a generally favorable impression (14 percent). In a similar survey conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun in 1971, the year before the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, 17 percent of 1,200 respondents said that they had no feelings in particular toward the emperor, while 61 percent expressed respect for and/or a favorable impression of him. The sharp drop since then in the percentage of people with a positive attitude indicates that Okinawans embraced some illusions about Japan before the reversion and idealized the portrait of the emperor and his family.

A similar change in attitude is reflected in relations with people from other parts of Japan. A team from the University of the Ryukyus, of which I was a member, found in a survey it undertook in 1982, 10 years after the reversion, that only 4.0 percent of 920 respondents had formed friendly relationships with people from other parts of the country, although 21.7 percent gave unrestricted travel to and from the mainland as an advantage of reversion to Japan. The team also learned that as many as 40.3 percent felt awkward
when with people from other prefectures. Asked how they would feel about one of their relatives or friends getting married to a person from another prefecture, 15.3 percent answered that it would be "desirable," 20.2 percent said it would be "undesirable," and 1.7 percent claimed it would be "impossible." The proportion of respondents seeing such marriages as desirable dropped precipitously in the decade following the return of Okinawa to Japan. According to a 1966 survey carried out by the University of Tokyo, 73.9 percent of 1,200 Okinawans were in favor of interprefectural marriages and only 11.9 percent against.

As these survey results show, the social distance between Okinawans and the people of the Japanese mainland has been widening ever since the reversion. On the other hand, the social distance between Okinawans and Americans is shrinking. In the 1966 University of Tokyo survey, only 9.5 percent of the respondents thought marriage to American "desirable," while 79.9 percent saw it as "undesirable." The proportion of respondents with a highly positive view of marriage between Okinawans and Americans was also small (5.9 percent) in the 1982 Ryukyu University survey, by this time those seeing such unions as undesirable had dwindled to 39.8 percent. This shift in attitudes is ironic considering the eagerness with which the Okinawans once looked forward to breaking away from U.S. military rule and reuniting with the Japanese mainland.

Comments on Okinawa's Situation

George H. Kerr, former Stanford University professor and author of *Ryukyu Kingdom and Province Before 1945* (1953), came to the following conclusion on the basis of his study of historical records.

Ryukyu has had importance for Japan only as a territorial frontier in a military sense, and as a quasi-colony the acquisition of which won Japan 19th-century prestige of "face" in her disputes with China. Japan is prepared to use the Ryukyus in any way to gain advantage for Tokyo; it is ill-prepared to make sacrifices for the island people.

This is a very serious accusation, but it is admittedly much to the point even today.

The diverse and complicated problems that confront Okinawa, most of which are the result of ineffective governmental policies, cannot be solved without the commitment of the national and prefectural governments. Many tasks that should have been carried out immediately after the war remain undone, indicating negligence and unconcern on the part of the administration. For example, the bones of nearly 8,000 of the people killed during
the battle of Okinawa have still not been collected for interment. And a large number of unexploded bombs dropped during the war are still buried underground in residential areas — it is estimated that more than 60 years are needed for their complete disposal.

Such things are a constant reminder to Okinawans that it is not militarists and aggressors who suffer most in wars, that weapons and troops cannot defend their homeland or their lives, and that the only chance for peaceful survival lies in abhorring war and following the traditional, peace-loving way of life. The "Okinawa no kokoro" (Okinawan mind) gives supremacy to human life and dignity; it gives value to friendly trade with neighboring countries, to hospitality based on mutual understanding, to peaceful coexistence. The history of Okinawa has essentially been that of a poor ethnic group at the southernmost tip of the Japanese archipelago, expendable whenever occasion demanded. The war taught a bitter lesson.

**Conclusion**

The following conclusions may be reached on the basis of the materials discussed and other material too numerous to be examined adequately in the space available.

1. Although researchers have tended to overlook the importance of the Cairo Declaration in its relation to the detachment of Okinawa, it was at the Cairo Conference that this policy was largely decided. The initial inclusion of Okinawa among the territories of Japan "taken by violence and greed" is particularly significant.

2. Okinawa was not initially included among the "minor islands" in the territorial clause of the Potsdam Declaration. Detachment did not result from Japanese acceptance of the terms of surrender but was conceived well before Japan surrendered.

3. The plan to divorce Okinawa from Japan, place it under exclusive U.S. control, and make it into permanent base was virtually decided before the U.S. military forces landed on Okinawa. This was, however, left ambiguous until around 1949 because of the lack of legal and political consensus among the victorious nations regarding territorial rearrangements.

4. The principle of "divide and rule" applied to Okinawa was not a unilateral decision by the United States but had the active support of the Japanese government, and, at least to that extent, was the product of a joint U.S.–Japanese effort.

5. Throughout the entire occupation of Okinawa, the U.S. and Japanese governments consistently adhered to the principle that "sometimes the greater good requires the lesser evil." Accordingly, the Okinawa minority was systematically ignored in the name of majority interests.

6. The principle of "divide and rule" was both directly and indirectly applied to Okinawa,
and was inseparably tied to U.S. postwar policy toward Japan. Therefore, any evaluation of the postwar reforms in Japan proper must take account of the postwar situation in Okinawa.
Footnotes


2. One reason why the manuals of civilian government for Okinawa and for Japan proper were prepared separately was that the authority to direct the campaign was also divided. This is why the Civil Affairs Handbook: Ryukyu(Loochoo) Islands was published by the Department of the Navy.

3. For details, see Masahide Ota, "Senryoka no Okinawa" [Occupied Okinawa], in Iwanami Koza Nihonshi [Iwanami lectures on Japanese History], vol. 23, Modern History II (1977), pp. 297–301.


7. See the Appendix to The Okinawa of the Loochoo Islands: A Minority Group in Japan.

8. For example, the same 4 documents cite a few basic statements which, it says, should be included in the first proclamation. FRUS, 1944, vol. 4 (1965), pp. 1209–1210.

9. Ibid., p. 1218.

10. Following Crist's appointment, Colonel William B. Higgins (in charge of provisions) and Colonel Frederick B. Wiener (in charge of administration) were appointed from the army, and Captain Lowe N. Bibby (acting department head) and Commander James N. Varnaman, III (in charge of administration) from the Navy to complete the staff.

11. The so-called Watkins Papers, unpublished documents at Stanford University, contain very useful information concerning military government on Okinawa.


13. Policies were adopted also to restore a money-based economy. The U.S. military government experimentally restored a money economy on Zamami, one of the Kerama Islands, in 1945, and Wiener, who administered the project, remarked to the Deputy-Commander for Military Government: "There is no room for long-range programs, for pampering of any sort, for economic utopias. The plan must show that it meets the cold-blooded requirements of minimizing imports. . . . We must hold their wants down and may not supply their needs above minimum humanitarian level."

15. It was only after February 1946 that the Navy's military government assumed control of the Miyako, Yaeyama, and Amami Islands.


17. Even the U.S. military records with regard to the changes in the command structure are incomplete.

18. On this point, a former staff member of the military government on Okinawa states: "Reorganizations within the on-the-spot military government staff on Okinawa have occurred with demoralizing frequency throughout the occupation. Changes in commanders, because of the Army's rotation policies, have been such that the average military governor has lasted little longer than a postwar French premier. Consequently, maintenance of coherence and continuity in plans and programs has proved an almost impossible task." See James N. Tull, "The Ryukyu Islands, Japan's Oldest Colony and America's Newest: An Analysis of Policy and Propaganda" (M. A. thesis, University of Chicago, 1953), p. 33.

19. Ibid., There are also other records which document this.

20. See the record of Harlan Youel, who worked for the military government on Okinawa in 1949-1950, at Columbia University's Oral History Department.


22. According to George Kerr, Okinawa was important first as a base from which to launch an assault on Japan, next as a "dumping ground" for undesirables from Japan proper and GHQ (in the "period of indifference"), and last as a permanent base to combat Communism's expansion. George H. Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island People (Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1958).


24. The war records on the battle of Okinawa, which can be found in Okinawa-ken shi [The history of Okinawa Prefecture], contain a good number of accounts of this kind.

25. In this regard, MacArthur comments, "It is a truism that democracy is a thing of the spirit which can neither be purchased nor imposed by the threat of application of force." FRUS, 1947, vol. 6, p. 455.

26. In this connection, one military government staff member commented: "This complete topographical transformation, frequently including senseless destruction of private property, was common throughout the war. Bulldozer operators have a psychology all
their own. In clearing an area, any obstacle in the neighborhood is a challenge and must be knocked down. Native buildings not destroyed in the fighting suddenly disappeared. These practices were rationalized on the grounds that 'It's all Jap stuff, anyway.' No appeal by the military government officers to the combat forces that such activities were unwarranted had any effect.” Tull, *The Ryukyu Islands*, p. 45.

27. For example, Kamejiro Senaga gives specific figures in denouncing the way military government pillaged Okinawa. See *Okinawa kara no hokoku* [Report from Okinawa] (Iwanami Shinsho, 1966).

28. Prime Minister Kishi, responding to a question from a Socialist Dietman in the House of Councillors' Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, remarked that Article 3 should be understood as a temporary measure, and expressed doubt about its legal validity. *Asahi Shinbun*, April 4, 1957.


30. See National Archives, Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, *The Minutes of the Twentieth Meeting of the Political Subcommittee*, dated August 1, 1942.

31. For details, see Kerr, *Okinawa*, p. 464.

32. In this regard, see Hugh Borton, *American Presurrender Planning Postwar Japan* (The East Asia Institute, Columbia University, 1967).


34. According to Hugh Borton, the Cairo Declaration was drafted jointly by the Territorial Subcommittee and the Area Committee. Borton, *American Presurrender Planning*, p. 13.

35. Kisaburo Yokota asserts that the Cairo Declaration has no direct relevance to Okinawa and contains no provisions concerning it on the grounds that the phrase "territories which she [Japan] has taken by violence and greed" does not apply to the history of Okinawa under Japan. Yokota, "Okinawa to Nihon no shukan" [Okinawa and Japanese sovereignty], *Okinawa no chii* [Okinawa’s position] (Yuhikaku), p. 108. In contrast, Professor Kanjun Higashionna, a noted specialist on Okinawa, suggests that the Japanese government's statement of having used force in annexing Okinawa might have led the United States to believe that this was indeed "taken by violence." Kanjun Higashionna, *Higashionnakanjunzenshu* [Collected works of Higashionna Kanjun] (Daiichi Shobo, 1978–1981), vol. 8, p. 60.

36. Professor Yokota comments, “Because this provision can be understood to mean the
four islands and the small islands adjacent, it is wrong to include Okinawa and Chishima. At the minimum, it is not possible to claim on the basis of this provision that Okinawa belongs to Japan.” Yokota, “Okinawa to Nihon no shuken,” p. 108.

37. Refer to the memorandum that the United States government sent to the Soviet Union on May 19, 1951, and to the records of the question and answer period for the 12th Session of the Diet in 1951. During deliberation in the House of Councillors, Dietman Kenzo Horigi asked if the Nansei Shoto were included among the “minor islands,” to which Kumao Nishimura, Director-General of the Treaty Bureau responded, “We think they were.”


40. Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State-Records of Harley A. Notter, 1939-1949. (This document consists of eight single-spaced typewritten pages.)


42. Meiji Bunka Shiryo Sosho [Records of Meiji culture], vol. 4, pp. 77–88.

43. Ibid., “Ryukyu Shobun” [Ryukyu disposition], vol. 2, p. 94.


45. See the Draft Treaty on the Disarmament and Demilitarization of Japan which the U.S. Secretary of State sent to Kennan, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, on February 28, 1946.

46. Comparision of the military government proclamation in Manila and Article 1 of the proclamation on Okinawa is enlightening in this regard. The latter states that occupation of Okinawa was necessary to ensure Japan’s demilitarization.

47. For instance, MacArthur comments: “The Joint Chiefs of Staff considers it appropriate to point out that effectiveness of the United States Army and Navy has already been reduced incident to demobilization, and that continuance of demobilization under current plans will, in the course of the next twelve months, further reduce the fighting strength of the United States armed forces to a point where it will be difficult to deal with any serious unrest in Japan.” FRUS, 1946, vol. 7, pp. 102–103.


50. *FRUS, 1948*, vol. 6, pp. 700—701.


53. Ibid., p. 138.