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<th>A Comprehensive Study on U.S. Military Government on Okinawa (An Interim Report)</th>
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<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Ota, Masahide; Miyagi, Etsujiro; Hosaka, Hiroshi</td>
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THE LAND PROBLEM (1952—1958)

Etsujiro Miyagi

The land problem was the single most important and troublesome issue of the 1950s for both the U.S. military and the residents of the island, causing serious friction and confrontation between the populace and the U.S. forces on the island and shattering whatever hopes the island people had entertained on the army that some of their leaders had once greeted with a sense of liberation. It awakened them to harsh realities of military occupation, bringing home to them the warning that Col. James T. Watkins, one of the popular military government officers in the early days of occupation, gave them: "Military government is the cat; Okinawan government is the mouse. The mouse will play only so long as the cat lets it."

The "Land Struggle," as the people came to call it, taught them a lesson that military control, no matter how seemingly benign, was no substitute for self-government, no matter how ineffective. It led them to the conclusion that the ultimate solution to their many problems lay only in the administrative reversion to Japan.

The problem was not merely a matter of land requisition and compensation. It was an issue that brought into question the legitimacy of the prolonged U.S. occupation and the very status of the Ryukyu Islands under international law. It was a matter of culture and the ways of living, as seen in the American failure to understand the deep attachment the island people had to their hereditary land, and in the American conviction that what was "right" for the Americans should and must be right for the people whom they perceived as immature, simple and backward.

This paper will deal with the period after the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Japan in 1952, because it was in this period that the land problem really erupted with all its impact on the politics and economy of the islands and the mutual perception of the Americans and the Okinawans.

Early Military Government Land Policy

In October, 1945, the military government began to resettle residents to their former homesites from the relocation areas, or "camps" designated during the Battle of Okinawa. The Naval Military Government Directive No.29, "Resettlement Plan and Policy" (23 Oct.1945) was perhaps the first document indicating policy of a sort concerning the use of land after the war. It provided that the military commander and the head of
each municipality could “allot” certain tracts of private land for housing, farming and construction of other facilities. It did not affect ultimate legal property rights of the landowners, but they could not evict other people from their lands, nor were they allowed to get rentals from people living on their assigned plots of land.

The “allotment system” was possible because the state of war between Japan and the U.S. had not yet ended, and it was necessary because large and convenient parts of land in many municipalities in central and southern districts had been taken for military use during and after the war. The directive was not implemented in the northern and southern Ryukyu island groups, where war damage was relatively slight and few military installations to speak of were located.

About one month after the resettlement program was launched, the military government issued Directive No.63, “Land Records—Assembling and Preservation of,” directing the district commanders to assemble, identify and put in their custody all available public records concerning the ownership of land. But, as almost all the land records had been destroyed during the battle on Okinawa, the military government issued another directive, MG Directive No.121, “Land Claims, Preparation of Data Concerning,” on Feb. 28, 1946, directing the Okinawa Advisory Council to establish a Land Claims Committee in each “Aza” and “Mura” of the municipalities and supervise collection of all pertinent data concerning land rights by the committees.

In the absence of any official records, the committee members and landowners had to resort to primitive methods of surveying, using sticks and ropes and depending on memories of landowners who had adjoining plots of land. As the surveyors were not allowed entry into the military used areas, they simply put down on their maps the acreages as reported by the landowners and adjusted their claims so that their total approximated the area used by the military. Time-consuming and inaccurate as it was, the work was continued until early 1950, when the collected data were submitted for final adjustment, determination and certification by the Central Land Claims Committee established by MG Directive No.1, “Central Committee, Determination and Certification of Land Title,” issued Feb. 1, 1950. About two months later, on April 14, 1950, MG Special Proclamation No.36, “Certification of Land Title,” providing for procedures for issuing land certificates, was promulgated, paving the way for the land policy contained in the Far East Command directive issued on Dec. 5, 1950.

With Mao Tse-tung’s victory in mainland China a foregone conclusion by mid-1949, the U.S. was rapidly preparing to build Okinawa into a permanent military base. In July of that year, the U.S. government appropriated some $50 million for FY1950
for base construction in Okinawa in accordance with a new policy adopted in the summer of 1948.

In 1949, the military government issued two directives pertaining to construction of houses and other structures in and/or outside the boundaries of the military-used lands and another one regarding the use of land adjacent to military highways. These directives, i.e., MG Directive No. 3, "Building Permits" (18 Jan.), MG Directive No. 17, "Native Buildings" (17 Jun.) and MG Directive No. 21, "Regulations Governing Use of Land Adjacent to Certain Highways," (27 Sept.) were intended to secure the existing installations, the road network and the areas already designated for military use, placing strict restrictions on construction of civilian houses near or around military installations and provided for severe punishments for violators.

But another housing regulation, MG Directive No. 2, "Building and Farming Restrictions," issued on Feb. 1, 1950, definitely anticipated construction of new installations in the already acquired areas and new land acquisition for future military use:

No new building or other structure for dwelling, agricultural or commercial purposes shall be built on Okinawa Shima within the boundaries of any existing military area... or within any of the areas required for future military use, as outlined on Military Government map "A" dated 1 February 1950....

The directive further said that native buildings presently located within any of the areas outlined on the MG map "A" would be allowed to remain, with the understanding that they would be removed "at such time as military development of the land requires their removal," and that farming presently allowed in such areas would also be abandoned "if and when military necessity for the use of such land arises."

The directive also said that certain areas being used by the military would be abandoned or certain installations moved to the "A" areas, and that the land formerly occupied by such installations would be returned to the owners. The military actually did so in certain areas such as Naha, whose downtown areas had been occupied by some 20 military installations until the early 1950s. But returning the land no longer needed did not mean that the military was reducing the size and number of its installations. On the contrary, the military, cognizant of the deteriorating international situation, was consolidating them for more effective use and was planning to acquire more land for future use.

Mao Tse-tung's government was declared established on Oct. 1, 1949, and Korean War broke out on June 26, 1950.
Up until this time, the military continued the use of the land taken during the battle, or confiscated new lands almost arbitrarily, and without compensation, but the landowners, resigned to the status of the occupied, did not complain, much less ask for compensation or rentals. The best they ventured to ask the military was to request for an extended period for notification of acquisition. The military returned lands no longer needed and in turn acquired new land, although the first directive that expressly dealt with land acquisition, MG Directive No.8, "Requisition and Appraisal Committee" was not issued until Aug.18,1950.

With regard to the use and acquisition of land in the pre-Treaty period, the military later legitimized it by the Rules of Land Warfare of the Hague Convention. (See Civil Administration Proclamation No.26, "Compensation for Use of Real Estate within Military Areas" issued 5 Dec.1953). As has been pointed out by many writers, it is highly doubtful if the Hague Rules could be applied to this case, because the Rules were drawn to govern the conduct of nations during the period of active hostilities. Much of the land was taken after active hostilities ceased.

**Toward New Land Policy**

On December 5,1950, the Headquarters, Far East Command, issued "Directive for United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands," changing the name of the military government to "civil administration," and appointing Commanding General, Ryukyu Command, as Deputy Governor of the Ryukyus, who reported to the higher echelon in Tokyo. The directive provided for U.S. responsiblity for Okinawa, objectives of the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) and establishment of local administration, and in its supplementary instructions to the Deputy Governor, stated basic U.S. land policy prescribing procedures for land acquisition and compensation. The directive was the first public statement from above revealing the U.S. intention to retain the Ryukyus indefinitely and make Okinawa into a permanent military base. It was also important in the sense that it clearly stated land policy of the U.S.

The Deputy Governor will secure title to any additional real estate or facilities required permanently by the United States Government by purchase from the owners, either Ryukyuan, Japanese or other nationality, or through condemnation. This property will be acquired through negotiated purchase if possible. If it cannot be purchased at reasonable terms or if the owners refuse to negotiate, condemnation proceedings will be instituted.1d(8)
And in regard to compensation, the directive showed two policies: 1) payment of rentals out of appropriated funds for the period on and after July 1, 1950, and 2) payment out of the counterpart funds of U.S. economic aid to the Ryukyus (GARIOA) for the period before July 1, 1950. These policies were later reaffirmed by the FEC directive issued on April 30, 1952, two days after the Treaty of Peace with Japan went into force. Partial payments for the July 1, 1950-April 27, 1952 period were made in 1953, but rentals for the period preceding it were finally paid as late as 1967. Payments for the pre-Treaty period (Aug. 15, 1945-June 30, 1950) were delayed because at the core of the entire problem was the question of which side, the U.S. or Japan, was legally responsible for compensation for property damage incurred during the period and both sides disclaimed such responsibility. The issue at its root concerned the very status of Okinawa.

Delay in the payment of rental and compensation for the earlier part of the pre-Treaty period was caused because the U.S. took the position that Japan had waived all war claims of its nationals against the U.S. by Article 19 (a) of the Peace Treaty, and therefore Okinawans had no legal rights to ask for compensation.

Testifying before the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives on June 7, 1955, Maj. Gen. Marquat said:

> For the period July, 1950 to April 28, 1952, the United States forces paid a rental to the Ryukyuan landowners. This was done pursuant to a United States decision that, from July 1, 1950 we would operate on a “pay as you go” basis in the area...¹

And as to compensation for the period preceding July 1, 1950, Marquat testified: “In the treaty of peace, Japan waived all war claims of its nationals against the United States. Accordingly, the Ryukyuans have no legal basis to press the United States for compensation for the use of their land prior to April 28, 1950.”

Japan on the other hand claimed that the U.S. government should be responsible for making the payment because it acquired complete authority over the islands initially by the U.S. Navy Proclamation No.1 (Nimitz Proclamation) and the SCAP memorandum of January 1946, and then by Article III of the Peace Treaty.

During the Cabinet Committee, House of Representatives, interpellation on June 1, 1956, Director Shimoda, Treaties Bureau, Foreign Ministry, testified:

> The Japanese Government does not necessarily concur with Gen. Marquat’s opinion. As a matter of fact, there still exists a particular relation that while
the U.S. Forces who is a causer of the claims are still stationed in Okinawa, the islanders have been under the U.S. administration, and yet the Occupation Forces is responsible for welfare of the islanders. Accordingly the United States is primarily responsible for compensation. ²

While disclaiming any legal responsibility, the Japanese Government granted a one billion yen “solatium” to the Okinawan landowners on condition that the money would be returned to the national treasury when the US government decided to pay the compensation.

Post-Treaty Land Policy

With the coming into force of the Peace Treaty, the U.S. assumed full responsibility for payment of rent to the landowners and therefore it now had to establish a legal basis for the continued use of the requisitioned land.

On April 30, 1952, two days after the treaty came into force, the Far East Command issued “Directive for United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands,” rescinding the FEC directives of Dec. 5, 1950 and Mar. 17, 1951, yet maintaining basically the same land policy contained in the original FEC directives. Governor of the Ryukyu Islands, General Mark W. Clark, also issued CA Proclamation No. 22 “Continuance of U.S. Administration under the Peace Treaty” on April 30, 1953, which provided for continuance in force and effect of all the proclamations, ordinances and directives so far issued, excluding those in conflict with the proclamation and those ordered rescinded, etc...

The first move the military took in its effort toward establishing a legal basis for the continued use of the land was to issue CA Ordinance No. 91, “Authority to Contract”. In a nutshell, the ordinance ordained that the Chief Executive of the Government of the Ryukyus act as the intermediary between the U.S. and the landowners in all matters pertaining to the land acquisition program, and most important, reiterated its earlier announcement to pay compensation for the pre Treaty period. In other words, what was intended by the ordinance was to secure leases and negotiate rental contracts favorable to the U.S. by offering the pre treaty compensation as an enticement.

The ordinance said that “it is desirable and expedient to effectuate the possession and occupation of certain lands and properties necessary to the Government of the United States and for the protection and security of the Government of the United States and of the Ryukyu Islands, and their people,” adding that “the Government of the United States is desirous of compensating private owners of property occupied for the above...
purposes, commencing 1 July 1950..."

The directive "authorized, empowered and directed" the Chief Executive to perform the following functions and responsibilities: the determination of legal owners of lands taken by the U.S., negotiations of leases with the landowners; preparation and execution of rental contracts between GRI and the landowners; execution of master contracts between GRI and the U.S. and execution of annual rental payments.

The terms of the contract provided 1) that the landowner must conclude the contract with GRI, 2) that he must agree to the sublease of his land to the U.S., 3) that the period of the contract run 20 years from July 1, 1950 and that the lessee can terminate the contract whenever it desires to do so on a 30-day notice, 4) that the land must be registered upon the conclusion of the contract, and 5) that the payment of compensation for the two years between July 1, 1950 and June 30, 1952 be made when the lease contract is completed.

The landowners revolted. The reason was that the rent offered was too small and the contract period too long. Out of some 40,000 landowners, only about 900, or about two percent, signed the contract. A total amount of ¥125,356,041 was set aside for the payments for the pre Treaty period of one year and 10 months, but when it was divided by the acreage of the land used by the military, it amounted to an average of only ¥1.81 per tsubo per year. The Ryukyuan Property Custodian of USCAR, which had former national and prefectural lands in its custody, rented the land to local residents for an average of ¥6 per tsubo. A pack of cigarettes at the time cost ¥23.

The amount of the annual rental was determined by the Army District Engineer at six (6) percent of what was called "fee value," which was arrived at by increasing the declared land value registered at the Land Offices for tax purposes as of April 28, 1952, by 10 to 50 percent in accordance with the use of the individual plot of land.

The landowners protested against the tie in deal, claiming that the pre treaty payment and the lease contract should be handled separately, and USCAR reluctantly gave in to the demand, issuing CA Ordinance No.105, "Authority to Accomplish Execution of Leases and Rental Payment on Privately Owned Ryukyuan Lands Occupied by the United States of America for the Period from 1 July 1950 thorough 27 April 1952." dated March 23, 1953.

This time USCAR attempted to obtain a lease contract and pay compensation for the pre Treaty period only. The ordinance empowered the GRI Chief Executive to act as an agent for the landowners, execute lease agreements and disburse rental payments in accordance with the property lists delivered to him by USCAR. It further provided:
"any owner of land subject to the operation and coverage of this Ordinance may reject and nullify the authority of the Chief Executive to represent or bind him... by filing due notice with the Chief Executive or the Land Section of the Government of the Ryukyus within thirty (30) days" after the publication of this ordinance.

Landowners were still cautious, but after the Chief Executive, speaking for USCAR, explained that the reception of the rental payments would not in any way affect their property rights, the owners agreed to receive the money.

USCAR Offensive

The land problem took a new turn when USCAR issued CA Ordinance No.109, "Land Acquisition Procedure," on April 3, 1953. The ordinance shocked the landowners as well as others who would not be directly affected by it, because it was a unilateral declaration of land taking by the military without giving the landowners any recourse to stop the taking.

The ordinance stated:

1) Okinawa District Engineer, with special approval of the Deputy Governor, accomplishes acquisition of land for temporary or indefinite use.

2) When negotiations with the landowners fail, the Deputy Governor will serve "personal, public and published Notice of Intent," which identifies the property and the estate to be taken, and also indicates the appraised value of the property and the amount of "just compensation."

4) Then the owner has 30 days from the issuance of the Notice to decide whether to accept or refuse the offer. In the event of refusal, he can, within the same 30 day period, appeal in writing to the Deputy Governor. Failure to do so means automatic transfer of the estate to the U.S. for the amount offered.

5) In the event of appeal, only the issue of just compensation will be determined, not the right of the U.S. to file a Declaration of Taking.

6) In the event of refusal, and after 30 days, the Deputy Governor will issue a formal Declaration of Taking and the required estate in land will be registered at the District Land Registry Office, and the amount of compensation determined by the District Engineer will be deposited in the Bank of the Ryukyus to the owner's account.

7) In the event of appeal, the Deputy Governor will refer it to the quasijudicial body called "U.S. Land Acquisition Commission", created by the ordinance and appointed by the Governor of the Ryukyu Islands. The Commission is
empowered to conduct hearings and determine the amount of compensation.

8) Compensation will cover loss of any crops, tombs, structures and or other improvements on the land.

9) During the course of appeal, the owner can withdraw up to 75 percent of the amount deposited in his name at the bank.

10) But when the Commanding General, RyCom., thinks it of "urgent necessity" to take certain lands, the Deputy Governor (CG, RyComm) can order the vacating of the lands even before the 30-day appeal period expires.

One week after the Ordinance No.109 was issued, USCAR issued Ordinance No.110, "Procedures for Payment of Compensation for Land Acquisition" (Apr.4, 1953), providing for detailed procedures for payment of compensation. It designated GRI as Trustee for receiving, holding and paying the compensation to the landowners, out of the funds paid by the U.S. Funds deposited but not paid may be withdrawn by order of the U.S. after one year, and no funds should remain in the owner's account longer than two years.

With the procedures for land acquisition and compensation established by decree, the military launched land taking by invoking the "urgent necessity" clause of Ordinance No.109. With the help of armed troops, the military took large tracts of land in Mekaru village of Mawashi, evicting recalcitrant farmers out of their lands at gun point on April 11, about a week after the promulgation of the ordinance. On the same day, in Ameku and Aja village near Naha, lands were taken including those tracts previously released by the U.S.

Landowners in many municipalities formed special land committees, and those committees were organized into the Federation of the Okinawa Shi-Cho-Son Military Used Land Committees on June 16. They were opposed to the policy of continuing the pre-Treaty leases, the methods of appraising their lands and the amount of compensation unilaterally determined by the military, as well as new acquisitions. The vast majority of them refused to sign the leases, and made their determination clear by not availing themselves of the money deposited in their names at the Bank of the Ryukyus.

On May 7, the Chief Executive requested USCAR that an Okinawan counterpart to the U.S. Land Acquisition Commission be established. USCAR readily approved the request and immediately approved appointment of five members to the newly-created Okinawa Land Commission. But the landowners did not expect much of the commission because they suspected that the commission was established just to assuage their anger,
with no real authority to influence the USCAR policy. They remained adamant in their opposition and many organizations rallied behind them.

Held in a stalemate by the opposition, and so failing to obtain the estate over the land already in use through negotiation and voluntary contract, USCAR finally promulgated CA Proclamation No. 26, "Compensation for Use of Real Estate within Military Areas," on May 12, declaring that the U.S., because it had been in continuous possession of the land since 1 July 1950, it had "an implied leasehold" and obligation to pay rent, and that its use of the land after 28 April, 1952, could be justified by the power of "eminent domain" conferred upon it by Article 3, Chapter II, of the Treaty of Peace with Japan.

The proclamation, stating that the U.S. originally took the land under rules and provisions of the the Hague Convention, further explained:

WHEREAS, by virtue of the power of eminent domain conferred upon the United States by Article 3, Chapter II, of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, the Armed Forces of the United States, subsequent to 28 April 1952, occupied and used certain other real estate needed by the United States forces, and

WHEREAS, the Armed Forces of the United States have been in continuous possession of a certain portion of the real estate designated as "Military Areas" from 1 July 1950 and subsequent dates prior to the date of this proclamation, and...

WHEREAS, the welfare and defense of the Ryukyu Islands requires the continued use and occupancy by the Armed Forces of the United States of all the Military Areas for an indefinite period of time, and

WHEREAS, agents of the United States have attempted, by negotiation, to enter into written agreements whereby the United States should acquire the right of use and occupancy of the Military Areas in return for estimated due compensation to the landowners, without success, and

WHEREAS, an implied lease and obligation of the United States to pay rent was created the day and date subsequent to 1 July 1950 said lands were requisitioned, and a leasehold interest was thereby vested in the United States as of said date, and

WHEREAS, the continued use of private lands for public purposes without compensation is abhorrent to the Constitution of the United States and may create hardship among the people of the Ryukyu Islands....

As to the payment of annual rentals, the proclamation said that the owner could draw the full amount of money deposited in the Bank of the Ryukyus via GRI by signing a statement that the rental values were satisfactory. Even in the event he considered the appraised value not satisfactory, he could withdraw up to 75 per cent of the money.
deposited, and within 30 days must file an appeal in writing to the Deputy Governor, who would refer it the U.S. Land Acquisition Commission for deliberation. The Commission's decision, "whether more or less than the estimated values," would be "binding and final."

To set up detailed administrative rules and regulations for the implementation of the proclamation, USCAR issued Ordinance No.120 "Compensation for Use of Real Estate within Military Areas" on Dec.9,1953, directing the Chief Executive to act as Trustee of the funds to be paid and perform all the necessary services for the payment of rentals on behalf of USCAR.

USCAR deposited, via GRI, a total amount of $3,982,500 in the Bank of the Ryukyus to pay the annual rentals for the period from April 28, 1952 through June 30, 1955. Out of this amount, landowners withdrew $3,100,288, as most of them chose to receive only 75 percent of the amount deposited in their names, indicating their dissatisfaction over the appraised values.

Not only did the USCAR intention to justify the use of the land by "implied leas" confuse the landowners, but it also added fuel to their anger and opposition. They were angered, because USCAR was apparently forcing them to accept whatever terms it determined unilaterally, showing no sign that their demands would be taken into consideration for appraising the value of their lands.

To summarize points of controversy in the land ordinances and proclamations, Ordinance No. 91 completely denied the landowners one of the fundamental principles of democracy, the right to free contract. Even when the landowner refused to sign the contract, he did not have any guarantee that his land would be returned, because the military only intended to obtain an EX POST FACTO consent to the use and possession of the land already taken. Nor was the landowner allowed to participate in determining the content of the contract, because the lessee, not the lessor, could unilaterally decide the period of lease and the amount of rentals. Because of the large number of the landowners, it was perhaps necessary, for practical purposes, to standardize the terms of contract, but such procedure for the sake of expediency was not justifiable when the terms of contract themselves were far from acceptable to the landowners who were deprived of their right to free contract.

Ordinance No. 109: it is simply a unilateral declaration of land acquisition, without any legal restrictions placed on the side of the administering authority in acquiring the land it needed, except for its subjective, therefore moral, consideration to minimize possible adverse effect of landtaking on the residents, and without any recourse left
for the landowners concerned to contest the legality of the right of the U.S. to requisition their land.

While authorizing the Deputy Governor to serve a Notice of Intent on the landowner, followed by the filing of a Declaration of Taking, and even to issue an order directing the immediate vacating of the land needed in case of "urgent necessity," the ordinance did not even clarify the legal grounds upon which the U.S. gained such right of requisitioning. It simply said:

Whereas the United States has certain requirements concerning the use and possession of land in the Ryukyu Islands and whereas there are no provisions of Ryukyuan law whereby such requirements may be satisfied, it is deemed appropriate and necessary to establish procedures for the acquisition of and just compensation for such interests in land as the United States must have for the carrying out of its responsibility in the Ryukyu Islands.

Proclamation No.26: the U.S. proclaimed that the U.S., by virtue of the fact of "continuous possession" of that real estate designated as "military areas" from 1 July 1950, "an implied lease" was created and a leasehold interest was vested in the U.S. But the proclamation itself admitted publicly that the U.S. attempted, without success (originally underlined), to enter into written agreements by negotiation: that is, the failure itself showed that no mutual agreement had been reached between the U.S. and the landowners.

The U.S. unilaterally declared it had "an implied lease," when there was no evidence that the landowners even implicitly agreed to the contract. The U.S. could justify its theory of "implied lease" by the fact that the landowners did receive some payments under Ordinance No.105, but they did so only after USCAR explained that their receiving the money would not in any way affect the rights of their property, nor would it establish the right of the U.S. to use and possess their lands. In substance, the Proclamation 26 was an attempt to establish the U.S. right to unilaterally requisition needed lands on the basis of the fiction of "implied lease." Legalities aside, however, the U.S. managed to establish a legal "excuse" for continued use of the land already taken and for acquisition of additional lands.

**Lump Sum Payment Policy**

The land problem entered a new phase of hot political controversy on March 17, 1954, when USCAR announced that it was planning to adopt a new policy called "lump sum payment", replacing the system of annual rental payments then in effect. In addition
to the announcement, USCAR issued a press release on the same day, quoting from an International News Service report datelined March 15 from Washington:

The Army said today it will seek funds to buy 45,000 acres of land in Okinawa and make it possible for 3,500 Okinawan families to relocate in Yaeyama. The Far East Command recommended that Army Secretary Robert T. Stevens ask an appropriation from Congress to make funds available to purchase 200,000 small plots from 50,000 owners of property now occupied by U.S. installations.

Maj. Gen. D.A. Ogden of American Military Government recently flew to Washington to propose outright purchase of the land, a move intended to answer complaints of the former owners that the 6% income in leases is too small to provide them capital with which to start elsewhere.

Ogden recommended lump sum payments and said that 3,500 displaced Okinawans could find homes in two Yaeyama islands, Ishigaki and Irinomote, if roads and schools were built with U.S. funds.

Local reactions to the announcement and the wire report were swift and violent. More than 35 organizations including the political parties immediately expressed strong dissatisfaction and opposition to the new policy. The lumpsum payment system, they reasoned, was tantamount to the permanent relinquishment of the titles to their land, with no rights reserved for the landowners to negotiate for new appraisals of their lands. The policy would solve the problem once for all for the military in regard to the lands already in use, and with no impediment to new acquisitions. As far as the military was concerned, it was in line with the land policy originally established in 2d(8) of the FEC Directive of April 30, 1952, which directed the Deputy Governor to secure title to any additional real estate or facilities required permanently by the U.S. by purchase or through condemnation.

According to "History of United States Land Acquisition in the Ryukyu Islands," a report prepared by the Rycom Headquarters and dated 1 November 1954:

On 16 October 1953, the Deputy Governor forwarded to the Governor a study of the land situation with the recommendation that all land in use by the United States (except that to be used only temporarily) be paid for in full through the acquisition of fee simple title. The Governor favorably indorsed these recommendations, forwarding the study to the Department of the Army, and information is that the Department of the Army is requesting from Congress in its next session, the funds for the payment in full on the land now in use but not for that to be acquired in the future. Instead of fee simple, the title
to be acquired is "superficies" which secures for the United States perpetual use of the land with residual title resting in the landowner. 4

The March 17 announcement by USCAR was an outcome of the policy formulated by the local command and recommended to the Department of Army. In addition to the right to use the land on a permanent basis, the policy was intended to save the military the trouble of repeated negotiations for reappraisals under the annual rental payment system as well as the financial burden of paying annually increased land rentals. Although the rentals as of 1954 were less than appropriate, the "History" admitted, it said "payment in full for land as taken is, therefore, imperative."

On April 30, 1954, the Ryukyuan Legislature passed a resolution drafted from three separate resolution bills earlier submitted by the Democratic Party, Socialist-Masses Party and the Peoples Party. It contained what was later came to be known as "Four Principles" on military-used land:

1) Opposition to the permanent use of the land and lump-sum payment.
2) Just and complete compensation, with compensation reappraised annually and paid annually.
3) Complete compensation for all damages to property.
4) Release of unused land and no further acquisition.

The four principles were adopted as the joint demands of the Quadripartite Conference of the Federation of the Shi-Cho-Son Military-Used Land Associations (later, Tochi-REN), Shi-Cho-Son Mayors Association, GRI Executive Branch, and GRI Legislature. The land problem was now escalating into an "islandwide struggle."

Despite the protest by the Legislature and the Land Federation, the military successively issued declarations of taking and orders to remove agricultural crops and houses from the Master Plan (military) Areas (designated in 1950) where original landowners had been allowed to live and farm on condition that their lands would be vacated upon notice from the military. Most affected were villages in Ginowan and Chatan municipalities in central Okinawa, Mawashi near Naha, and Ie island off northern Okinawa, where a bombing practice range was being planned. Several hundred families were displaced from their lands.

The Legislature again passed a resolution on August 30, 1954, addressed to the Deputy Governor, in a desperate attempt to stop further requisitions, claiming that the loss of farmlands was tantamount to a death sentence for the farmers affected.

Deputy Governor Ogden, however, sent a message to the Legislature on Nov. 1,
1954, in which he termed the April 30 resolution (Four Principles) as "unrealistic propositions", and reiterated the U.S. policy to take "any and or all private land" if necessary for public use as long as the U.S. has jurisdiction over the Ryukyu Islands.

Okinawan land under leasehold as of 1 October 1954 was as follows:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Installation</th>
<th>Total Acres</th>
<th>Arable Acres</th>
<th>Non-arable Acres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>19,092.41</td>
<td>6,456.56</td>
<td>12,634.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>20,236.46</td>
<td>8,707.77</td>
<td>11,528.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>867.79</td>
<td>745.23</td>
<td>122.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,715.97</td>
<td>775.41</td>
<td>940.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>41,912.63</td>
<td>18,884.97</td>
<td>25,226.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(History of United States Land Acquisition in Ryukyu Islands, Hqtrs, Rycom, 1 Nov. 1954)

- Total area of Okinawa—290,555 acres
- Arable land—80,150 acres
- Population density—730 per sq/mile

**Arable Land Available to Natives**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Arable</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area of Okinawa</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>210,500</td>
<td>290,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>US required land -1945</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>42,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available for Okinawans</td>
<td>63,000</td>
<td>185,500</td>
<td>428,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Additional US requirement in near future</td>
<td>2,340</td>
<td>38,007</td>
<td>40,347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available for Okinawans</td>
<td>60,660</td>
<td>147,493</td>
<td>208,153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Land productivity**

- Arable land to raise food for 1 person (200 tsubo) ...... 0.164 acres
- Arable land now available each person .................... 0.100
- Arable land under near future requirements .............. 0.096

(Source: same as above)
The same document stressed why the rentals had to be paid in lumpsum:

Since the first taking of land, each subsequent tract acquired by the United States increases the problem of land on Okinawa. The average individual holding on Okinawa is 8/10th acre (1,000 tsubo) which will provide subsistence for a family of five. In the year 1950, the appraised valuation of land averaged $168 per holding which increased to $264 in 1952 and is $364 in 1954. It can be readily seen that with the average holding in 1954 paying $21.84 per year rent, it would not only be impossible for a family to live when their land is taken away, but it would also be impossible for them to relocate, thus placing them in relief. Payment in full for land as taken is, therefore, imperative.

The paper further stated that "the Okinawan asks only those rights which the United States would grant to its own citizens in condemnation."

The military was aware also that the land problem had deteriorated not only because the rent had been fixed at a below-subsistence level (6% of the appraised land value established without any concurrence by the landowners), but also because the military did not have sufficient funds readily available to pay for dwellings in areas condemned or ordered to be vacated, for whatever improvements on land, for expenditures needed for moving and relocation. Funds for such purposes were either forthcoming or to be appropriated by Congress, but complicated legal and administrative procedures hampered the effective utilization of the funds at the time they were urgently needed.

In a Memorandum for the Deputy Governor, dated 18 November, 1954, Maj. Dallas A. Sharp, Land Control Officer, said, "We are faced with insufficient money to resettle the displaced landowners, reluctance of displaced natives to resettle under present conditions there (Yaeyama) and continuous political agitation." In the "Discussion" attached to the memorandum, Sharp continued to say:

To bring one additional division (of military personnel) to Okinawa would require the acquisition of 40,347 acres and relocation of 1,135 families. Under the system now authorized by law the family whose land is to be taken would be paid in cash for any buildings or improvements on his property and rental based on 6% of the fee value of his land... It can be seen readily, therefore, that it would be impossible for him to arrange to purchase other land even if the land is available... If he were able to rent other land at the same figure, he would still have the expense of moving for which he has no capital and which, at present, the United States does not provide. We have, in effect, placed this landowner on relief and taken away his means of providing food for his family.
And he added, “Resistance to relocation from his land has developed to a point where, without payment, he flatly refuses to leave his land unless put off by force.”

Meanwhile, the U. S. Land Acquisition Commission started hearings on appeals submitted to the commission by landowners under provisions of CA Ordinance No. 109, dated 3 April 1954. By October of 1955, the Deputy Governor had referred to the commission about 42,000 appeals pertaining to some 116,000 tracts of land or real property located in 35 municipalities, according to “Brief Outline of United States Land Acquisition Commission,” a paper prepared by USCAR, dated 20 October 1955.

The commission deliberated on most of the cases but withheld decisions until after a Congressional committee investigation in Okinawa scheduled for October of that year. It was thought advisable to avoid any possible complications and confusion which would have resulted from decisions of the Commission while the U. S. Land Acquisition program itself was under deliberation by Congress, the document said.

In the course of deliberation, however, the Commission found out many facts showing discrepancies between appraised values of land between the military and the civilian sides. They disclosed, among other things:

- That GRI Government purchased waterfront land in Naha Port in 1954 at ¥6,000 per tsubo. This land was appraised by the United States in 1952 at a value from ¥1,500 to ¥3,500 per tsubo.
- The Bank of the Ryukyus would not loan money to owners of land held by United States Forces using such land as collateral.
- Annual rentals in Naha established by the United States in 1952 were lower than annual rentals established by rental appraisal committees consisting of local boards of citizens in 1952 under the Gunto Government Proclamation No. 5 issued 15 October 1951 which controlled rental of allocated land.
- Land owners dispossessed by the United States were required to pay higher rental than they received from the United States for similar land.
- Although one tsubo of dry farm land grade #4 produced ¥82.80 worth of Okinawan sweet potatoes per year, OKED (Okinawa Engineer District) rental for this same land was ¥1.92 per tsubo per year. Therefore, these farmers were receiving a rental of less than 2.5% of what their land would produce per annum.

In the midst of the mounting protest, an overwhelming majority of the landowners indicated their opposition to the lump-sum payment and new land acquisitions by submitting appeals to the U.S. Land Acquisition Commission and joined huge protest
rallies then held day after day in Naha and elsewhere. According to the Military-Used Land Owners Federation, a total of 18,817 out of 18,864 landowners who belonged to the Federation were opposed to the new policy, with only 47 consenting.

In the island-wide elections held March 14 for the 29-man Legislature, the conservative Ryukyu Democratic Party won 12 seats, but the reformist Ryukyu Socialist Masses Party and the radical Okinawa Peoples Party also won 12 and 2 respectively, with the remaining 3 held by independents. As a result, the house came under control of the reformist forces, and OSMP's Taira Koichi replaced a conservative as speaker of the house.

This was one indication that many voters, having witnessed high-handed moves taken by USCAR with regard to the land problem, had become increasingly critical of U.S. policy toward Okinawa, and at the same time, of the weak-kneed posture of GRI vis-a-vis USCAR over the problem, making the voters even more sympathetic toward the reformist platforms calling for increased opposition against the land policy and advocating the administrative reversion of the Ryukyus to Japan and more autonomy for their government.

Counter-Communism Campaign

To counter this general trend, USCAR adopted, broadly speaking, three policies: 1) continued efforts toward the solution of the land problem by gradual concession, 2) to launch an intensive counter-communism campaign (because the military apparently attributed the aggravation of the land problem to communist agitation), and 3) to make clear the U.S. intention to stay in Okinawa permanently (thereby dampening the general mood favoring reversion.)

However, to the chagrin of the Deputy Governor and the Civil Administrator, the reformist-controlled house set up "Committee for the Public Election of the Chief Executive" on April 14, and disregarding the Deputy Governor's statement issued the following day to the effect that public election of the chief executive would not be held until after communist threats ceased to exist, proceeded to adopt a resolution on April 22 calling for early public election of the GRI head, who had been appointed by the Governor, and for expansion of GRI autonomy.

This resolution was followed a week later by the land resolution containing the "four principles" earlier mentioned.

The selection of the Socialist speaker apparently put USCAR on alert. Civil Administrator Brig. Gen. Charles Bromley said on April 7 that, although "changing
complexions of the Legislature does not necessarily affect the other branches of the Government," "it is impossible for the Civil Administrator to work or collaborate with communists and their supporters."

And he warned: "it is entirely inappropriate for the Legislature to concern itself with election of the Chief Executive, which is a matter for determination of the Governor." (USCAR Press release, 7 April 1954)

Perhaps reflecting the "red scare" in the continental U.S., USCAR or the military launched a clamp-down on activities of the Okinawa Peoples Party, which it had been suspecting of as a disguised communist party. In a blind haste to discourage residents from joining May Day festivities, USCAR made a mockery of itself on April 24 when it declared in a press release that May Day was the birthday of Karl Marx, and therefore non-communists should not participate in any activities scheduled for the day.

The press release said in part:

> May Day is the birthday of Carl(sic) Marx, author of the communist bible. On 1 May communists all over the world are required to demonstrate and harass the police and governments of all free countries. People who are not communists should avoid gatherings of communists on that day.

> Communists and their supporters can easily be identified on Carl(sic) Marx Day and non-communists are therefore urged to avoid association with any communist on the first day of May and to avoid attendance at communist supported gatherings. Otherwise innocent citizens may be easily mistaken as communists and communist supporters by the agencies of law and order.  

In a press release issued three days later, USCAR correctly spelled Marx's first name and called May Day a "recognized holiday of International Communism." Publicly denouncing Kamejiro Senaga and his Peoples Party as the "behind the scene" operator of the "communist show," USCAR threatened the public: "It is obvious that any who attend the rally invites identification of themselves as professed communists."  

Another press release issued May 1 triumphantly declared that the May Day festival rally "attended only by 396 persons failed miserably," as 3,000-5,000 people were attracted to a USCAR-sponsored rodeo presented by a combined team of Hawaiians and GI cowboys and a band concert by the 29th U.S. Army Band near the Executive Building.  

On May 4, USCAR issued still another press release titled: "Lenin and Stalin Are Dead, But Communists, including Those of Peoples Party, Continue to Spread Doctrine of Discord in Effort to Destroy Properly Constituted Governments and Bring All People under Whipsnand of Moscow".  

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Earlier this year (27 April 1954), USCAR promulgated CA Ordinance No.132, "Certain Parades and Processions Prohibited or Subject to Permit: Penalty for Violation," prohibiting all parades, processions, marchings on public streets or highways and assemblies involving more than 50 persons without a written permit from the Chief of Police, with violations punishable by a fine not exceeding ¥5,000 or imprisonment not exceeding three months or both. The ordinance was evidently intended to place added restrictions on rallies and demonstrations, because Military Government Ordinance No.1, of June, 1949, “The Code of Penal Law and Procedure,” had already prohibited demonstrations and assemblies “hostile, detrimental, or contemptuous toward the Military Government or the United States” (2.2.16).

USCAR’s attack on the Peoples Party grew in intensity as the land problem deteriorated. As early as August 1952, Deputy Governor Maj. Gen. Robert S. Beightler warned the Legislature: “the Ryukyus Peoples Party is pursuing a course, which, if allowed to continue unchecked, can lead to the establishment of a communist-dominated regime in these islands.”

On 22 January 1953, (the U. S. Military) Superior Provost Court convicted and sentenced Koji Oyama, a Naze, Oshima City Assemblyman and OPP member, to three years of imprisonment (with a ¥25,000 fine) for circulating one of the 13 magazines USCAR had branded as “libelious to the U. S.” in their editorial policy. The sentence was later commuted to one month at hard labor and a fine of ¥2,000 by Civil Administrator Brig. Gen. James M. Lewis, the reviewing authority in the case. (USCAR Press Release 27 Feb. 1953). He was convicted for violation of MG Ordinance No.1,2.2.21 pertaining to the publication, circulation and possession of undesirable publications.

On 24 February, 1954, despite its declared position of neutrality in local elections, USCAR issued a reminder to the voters that “participation in a democratic election is a privilege enjoyed by members of free world communities, as contrasted to controlled elections under communism,” although it did not mention OPP by name. 10 The March 14 elections ended in the victory of the reformist forces.

On 21 April 1954, USCAR declared that OPP was a communist party under direction of the Japan Communist Party, and on May 8 advised GRI Chief Executive to annul the appointment of three “communist sympathizers”to the GRI Central Labor Relations Commission.

It was apparent that in USCAR’s opinion, the local residents were being misled by OPP and its sympathizers in their opposition to the land policy and in their support for reversion to Japan. In its 16 August 1954 press release, it announced that
investigation by the Ryukyu Command disclosed the existence of the Okinawa Prefectural Committee of the Japan Communist Party since early 1954. It said that the Committee’s objectives in Okinawa, among others, were 1) to advocate immediate and unconditional reversion of the Ryukyus to Japan, and 2) to expand its influence with landowners and farmers. “Almost all members of the Committee have been active in guiding and agitating, either directly or indirectly, the Okinawans who have been involved in the land problem resistance,” it said.

The disclosure by the Ryukyu Command was followed by another announcement by the Civil Information & Education Department Director Earl H. Diffenderfer of USCAR on August 30, which “proved” the identity of OPP as a branch of JCP under a different name by enumerating similarities of the two organizations in their objectives and activities.

Alarmed by the revelations and eager to seize upon the opportunity to regain control of the Legislature, the conservative Democratic Party introduced two bills to the plenary meeting on the last day of the five-month long Fourth Legislative Session: a proposal for legislation to outlaw communism and a non-confidence vote against the reformist speaker and vice-speaker of the house.

The conservatives argued that the house lost confidence of the military by selecting the reformist speaker and vice-speaker, when there was “a mountain of problems” which could not be solved without assistance and understanding of the U.S. In fact, USCAR and military leaders had given a cold shoulder on the house leaders and never invited them to parties given for visiting military dignitaries, even when General John E. Hull, Governor of the Ryukyus, visited the island.

After several hours of wrangling, the non-confidence bill was passed, because two legislators who had seceded from OSMP sided with the conservatives. Speaker Taira and Vice-speaker Miyagi were expelled and replaced by Kunihiro Ohama and Akio Nagamine.

Although some apprehensions were expressed and a few minor modifications were made in the language of the bill, the anti-communism proposal was adopted 26 to 2, with only the two OPP members dissenting, and was referred to a special 10-man committee which included Kamejiro Senaga of OPP, the very man USCAR had been trying hard to banish from the local political scene, for the purpose of fact-finding to determine if there existed any communist party or organizations affiliated with such a party in the Ryukyus.

Even the local newspapers editorially endorsed the bill, with reservations that the
committee, in its zeal and haste in outlawing communism, must not infringe upon individual freedoms, and that its investigation should not be utilized for expansion of interests of any particular party.

The committee, with the encouragement and blessings of the Deputy Governor, held its first meeting on Sept. 20, 1954, and convened 14 more times until April of the following year, when a draft for the "Bill concerning the Prevention of Communistic Activities" was made. The bill, mainly drafted by Chairman Katsu Hoshi (Democratic Party) after Japan's "Anti-Subversive Activities Act," went even further than its model, by proposing to bar from any public office any person identified as communist by an anti-communistic activities commission appointed by the chief executive and to deprive such a person of the right to apply for various permits including that for commercial transactions with foreign countries, and more important, to vest in the chief executive the power to dissolve any party judged by the committee as communistic.

The bill was finally shelved after it came under bitter attack from law professors of the University of the Ryukyus, and OSMP members withdrew their support for the bill.

The attempt to outlaw communism miscarried, at least partly, because OPP itself provided USCAR with an opportune excuse to clamp down on it. On October 6, 1954, about 40 OPP members and their supporters, including Chairman Senaga, were arrested on charges of having harbored two OPP members from Oshima who had been ordered by USCAR to leave the island as "undesirable persons." Senaga and Ichiro Matayoshi, mayor of Tomigusuku, were sentenced by USCAR court on Oct. 21 to imprisonment for terms of two years and one year, respectively, and were committed to the Okinawa Prison.

USCAR and OTA

USCAR began to keep a wary eye on activities of the local school teachers' groups in early 1953, when the Association for the Reversion of the Okinawa Islands to the Fatherland (Okinawa Shoto Sogoku Fukki Kiseikai), comprised of the Okinawa Education Federation (Okinawa Kyoiku Rengokai), All Okinawa School Principals' Association (Zento Kochokai), Okinawa Women's Federation (Okinawa Fujin Rengokai), Okinawa Youth Federation (Oki Seiren), Okinawa Athletic Association (Okinawa Taiiku Kyokai) and Okinawa Municipal Mayors Association (Okinawa Shi-Cho-Soncho Kai), was formed on 10 January of that year and named Chobyo Yara as president. (Okinawa Kyoiku Rengokai was reorganized into Okinawa Teachers Association-OTA-in April.)
The reversion association held its first reversion rally in Naha Jan. 17 of the following year (1953). A resolution was adopted during the rally, demanding the abolition of Article III of the Peace Treaty, which gave the U.S. jurisdiction over the Ryukyu Islands, and complete reversion of Okinawa to Japan. It was also resolved that the Association send a delegation to Japan to spread the message of reversion and solicit cooperation toward the reconstruction of the war-damaged school buildings on Okinawa. The delegation, headed by Yara, left Okinawa Jan. 20 on a 150-day tour in mainland Japan. Its exit was approved by the military because the purpose of the tour ostensibly was “to inspect educational facilities in Japan.”

Once in Tokyo, the delegation, whose members doubled as members of the reversion association and the Association for Promotion of Reconstruction of War-Destroyed School Buildings in Okinawa (Okinawa Sensai Kosha Fukkyu Sokushinkai), launched an extensive fund-raising campaign throughout Japan, giving lectures and holding photo exhibitions showing grass-roofed school buildings and barefooted children. The campaign was continued in Japan even after the return of the delegation by a namesake organization headed by Meitatsu Takamine, Okinawan resident in Tokyo, and by February 1954, some $150,000 in Japanese yen had been collected, with a target amount set at some $166,000 (60,000,000 J¥).

On Nov. 10, 1953, the Reversion Association was reorganized with the number of its member organizations increased from six to 23 including, to name a few, such unlikely groups as the conservative Democratic Party, Dentist Association, Buddhist Church, Agriculture-Fishery Association, Medical Association, War-Bereaved Families Association, Council for Promotion of Payment of Pensions, and the Mass Media. Participation of such groups of various hues and persuasions was apparently prompted by the unanimous adoption in the Japanese House of Representatives three days earlier of a reversion resolution, sponsored by a group of 62 representatives headed by Eisaku Sato (then Secretary-General of the Liberal Party and later Prime Minister) for reversion of Okinawa and the Bonnin Islands. Yara was re-named as president of the Association.

Then, on Jan. 11, 1954, Deputy Governor Ogden issued a statement calling for a stop to the reversion movement, which he described as a “waste of time and energy” when there were many other important problems to be attended to for constructive purposes. Reiterating in effect the U.S. policy announced by President Eisenhower in his Jan. 7 message to Congress that the U.S. would hold Okinawa indefinitely, Ogden declared that the U.S. right to maintain the base on Okinawa could not be separated from U.S. jurisdiction over the islands.
Yara’s reply dated Feb. 5 to the Governor’s statement read:

The reversion movement was born of the very natural and essential idea that since we are Japanese we wish to live as Japanese under the protection of the Japanese Constitution...

Our reversion movement is right and natural on the basis of the democratic principle of inhabitants pursuing their own happiness which the United States confirms in the United Nations Charter, the Atlantic Charter and in her own constitution...

We inhabitants well understand that our island Okinawa is strategically important as a base for defense of the free nations against the aggression of world communism, and have been cooperating with the United States in her construction of bases here by furnishing valuable land and labor...

However, it is unthinkable to us that our enjoying of life as Japanese nationals will interfere in any degree with the maintenance by the United States of the bases here...

Assuring that OTA does not subscribe to communism or anti-Americanism, Yara continued:

Indeed, in spite of your statement of such nature, we do not recognize any necessity of changing in any way our idea of reversion...

If our movement is rightful and natural one as Japanese, it will have to be continued until we shall revert to Japan. It must be emphasized that our movement is not of such nature as to perish unless it is proved that it is neither rightful nor natural....

In a letter addressed to Yara (dispatched Feb. 24), Civil Administrator Charles Bromley said:

It is regretted that your continuation of reversion agitation in Okinawa can result only in confusion for Ryukyuans and comfort to the Communists.... Reversion agitation, therefore, cannot be continued with the concurrence of the civil administration, and your request for USCAR cooperation in reversion activities is ill-advised....

There is no place for the teacher in reversion activities or in active politics. The teacher is hired to teach the children of the people, not to create confusion in the minds of the young, or to pit himself against the population and the established government....

Referring to the school building project being augmented by U.S. aids, Bromely flatly said USCAR would proceed with the project “either with or without the cooperation
of the Teachers' Association."

In another dispatch to Col. Louis M. Gosorn, of Headquarters, Far East Command, Bromley, referring to the donations collected in Japan, expressed his concern:

It appears to me that if the United States were at this time... to permit entry of Japanese funds for any reconstruction, it would serve no purpose other than to provide Japan the opportunity for exploiting and taking full credit for our own accomplishments.... I suggest, therefore, the Japanese Government be advised, through diplomatic channels, that the U.S. is assuming full responsibility for school reconstruction and that Japanese yen funds regardless of private or public source can be much better used in providing assistance to Ryukyuan students in Japan...

I... remain strongly convinced that under no circumstances should any Japanese funds be allowed to be used for Okinawa public school construction. 13

How he regarded Yara and others who joined him in the donation campaign in mainland Japan is evident from the following paragraph from the letter:

I have just learned that a sum of approximately $150,000 has been raised in Japan for reconstruction of Ryukyuan school buildings. This has been accomplished through a group of anti-American Ryukyuans residing in Japan, the leader of whom is Mr. Meitatsu Takamine, vice-president, Okinawa War Damaged School Buildings Reconstruction Association. He has been ably assisted by Mr. Chobyo Yara, chairman of this association as well as the Okinawa Teachers group, and the reversion society. 14

USCAR's perception of the campaign was strongly influenced by an Okinawan leader in Tokyo whom USCAR officials considered as "pro-American." During his visit in Okinawa in early 1954, he advised "strongly against granting permission for the money to be brought in, pointing out... that Japan and OTA will take credit for all reconstruction in their propaganda activities for the reversion of Okinawa." (Memo for record, by H.E.D., Feb.10). He also told USCAR that "Yara has purposefully deceived Ryukyuans in Japan and Diet members concerning the true status of school buildings and with an omission of reference to any of the rehabilitation accomplished by the United States." 15

Another undated memo prepared by a person who sat with the Okinawan leader from Tokyo during his visit on USCAR volunteered a "personal view" with regard to the problem: "Takamine, (Ryoko) Nakayoshi (who spearheaded the reversion movement in Japan-- the parentheses added), Seiryo Kamiyama and many other people are anti-American by nature and their action must be watched carefully." He added:
The actual use of such contributions for school building construction will give them an opportunity to cite extreme generosity of Japanese and indifference and non-assistance of U.S. As a result it is feared that a highest degree of anti-American feeling and reversion movement may generate. 16

In August of the year, USCAR invited Takamine, whom USCAR had regarded as one of the leaders of the anti-American campaign, to Okinawa to show him the U.S.-sponsored school construction program on the island. Takamine apparently was led to change his view. After returning to Tokyo, he wrote to Deputy Governor Ogden:

In am happy to inform you that a council meeting was called on August 28 by our Association... and it was decided at the meeting to accept one of the plans suggested by the Okinawan side, namely, to use the funds for purchase of educational equipment or books...

After listening to my explanation, the Council members were convinced that what had been aimed at in the campaigns of our Association has now been fully attained in Okinawa thanks to your kind efforts and the meeting has unanimously decided to express the gratitutde of our association for what you have kindly done for the reconstruction of school buildings.... 17

Ogden’s reply on 14 Sept commented: “Your decision to use your funds for the purchase of educational equipment and/or books appears to be very realistic. Certainly, I am most pleased to learn that that decision was made as a result of of the accurate reports no doubt given by you on the current status of the school reconstruction program.”

Now USCAR focussed its attention on Yara, who was preparing to go to Tokyo again, allegedly to get the funds deposited in a Tokyo bank. A memo to Deputy Civil Administrator from the USCAR Education Department said that “it is the recommendation of the undersigned... that Mr. Yara be not permitted to go to Japan at this time. While Mr. Yara manifests a change of attitude toward the United States, indications are that such modification of attitudes is superficial only and does not reflect a development of insight.”

The lack of sound reasoning necessary for sincere attitudinal modification is so apparent as to lead one to believe that he may be acting and responding only as a result of being under orders from Mr. Takamine. I believe that further intensive work, as is currently being done by members of this staff, must be accomplished with Mr. Yara before insight can be developed.... 18

Under USCAR pressures and also from his personal admission that he was no longer in position to lead the reversion movement effectively, Yara resigned from the
post of the Reversion Association and Okinawa Teachers Association, and the Association soon disintegrated.

The reversion movement stayed dormant for five years after it was disbanded in May, 1954, until January, 1960, when a new reversion organization was formed.

During that period, attention and energy of those member organizations was directed at such political and social problems as the promulgation of the New Penal Code (March, 1955), the education ordinance (Ord. No. 165, March. 1957), and most of all, the progressively deteriorating Land Problem.

**Okinawan Delegation to Washington**

By November, 1954, with all possible means exhausted to force the military to change its land policy under Proclamation No. 26, local leaders and landowners' representatives came to realize that the only way now left with them was to make a direct appeal to the U. S. Government by sending a delegation to Washington.

During a press conference attended by press members and local Land Advisory Commission, Deputy Governor Odgen had one of his aides read his prepared statement, in which he explained the policy contained in Proclamation No.26, and added, "Neither the (U.S. Land Acquisition) Commission nor this command has the power to change the decisions of Congress as contained in CA Proclamation No.26, and it does no good to present such political arguments (for abolishing or amending the proclamation) to the Commission."

He said, however, "I can only tell you that in my opinion based upon observation of our Congress over a long period of time, the present indefinite rental is probably not a final action, that the eventual settlement will be equitable and fair, and that the matter undoubtedly will receive a careful review in the near future."

Asked if it was at all conceivable to send an Okinawan delegation to Washington, Ogden said, "I can only say that I will give you every opportunity that I can to get the best settlement possible."

The local command and the Department of Army agreed, perhaps reluctantly but for the sake of appeasement, to send an Okinawan delegation to Washington. But they had apprehensions: a TWX message from Department of Army to Commander in Chief, Far East Command (Governor of the Ryukyus) said:

'(It) might be unwise for the Department of Army to sponsor appearance of delegation if it is likely to oppose before congressional committee the principle of long term acquisition and lump sum payment for which DA is seeking
authorization. Expression of such Ryukyuan opposition might result in congressional rejection of land acquisition authorization and indefinitely delay settlement of the Ryukyuan land problem.\textsuperscript{19}

The Department was then asking for authorization of $24.8 million for lump sum payment and $5.7 million for resettlement of dispossessed families.\textsuperscript{20} The message therefore requested that the Deputy Governor consult with the delegation members in regard to the authorization request. It also mentioned: "Your views reflect denial (of) opportunity (of) delegation (to) present views to Congress in event delegation is irrevocably committed to position (against the policy of long term acquisition and lump sum payment)."

The Deputy Governor did "consult" with the members of the delegation with regard to the current land policy, Army's budget request and possible reactions of Congress to their "principles." A message dated 13 May 1955 from USCAR to CINCFE said in part:

> Despite advice of DepGov many months of intense local political agitation prevents delegates from publicly asking for less than what is contained in principles.\textsuperscript{21}

The message said that opposition to the lumpsum policy was reinforced by expressed demands of the Federation of Landowners, the Legislature and the Executive Branch of GRI, but five members of the delegation would support lump sum if the funds for it were raised more than five times to 132 million dollars, while a Socialist delegate was opposed to any form of lumpsum compensation. Even the five members would in no event support a figure substantially less, it said.

> All delegates fully understand DepGov considers their position unrealistic and result may mean Congressional rejection present bill. They state they prefer rejection of amount requested by Department of the Army. Position of delegation would be their figures based on what they claim to be method of compensation used in Japan although DepGov has pointed out differences in situation.

To quote further from the message:

> Because of intense emotional and political build-up over many months in local press and legislature for delegation to present views to Congress there will be strong reaction here if they are not invited. This will undoubtedly be directed at Chief Executive and USCAR. If refused, appeals to Japan can be anticipated on grounds United States Congress will not hear their pleas and confidence in democratic processes will be greatly lessened...
Although apparent that delegation would not retract from position versus lump sum payment before departure despite repeated advice of DepGov and Civil Administrator, if they are invited recommend strongest efforts be made by Department of the Army and any other prominent persons available and sympathetic, to divert delegation to position that although they would prefer annual payment reasonable lump sum would be acceptable. Feel that members of delegation, even Land Federation representative, realize that lump sum payment of equitable amount may be accepted by people if program gains momentum...

Position here has been no objection to delegation of Ryukyuan presenting views to Congress if invited...

Although the Deputy Governor recommended that the delegation left for Washington around May 17 to allow sufficient time for U.S. officials to have "preliminary discussions" with the delegation, the departure of the six-man group headed by Chief Executive Shuhei Higa was not announced by USCAR until May 20.

The delegation left the island for a 26-day visit on May 23. An initial round of talks with Army leaders yielded no results in their favor. Maj. Gen. Marquat, chief of Civil Affairs/Military Government in the Department of Army told them that rentals would be paid in lumpsum, with the rentals appraised in accordance with the purpose of the land used, and that a single, uniform standard would be applied to the evaluation of all kinds of land.

Marquat at that time also testified before the House Armed Services Committee that the Okinawans, being Japanese, had no legal right to press their demand for pre-Peace Treaty claims against the U.S. because Japan had waived such rights in the treaty.

But after a series of conferences with Congressional committee members, the delegation finally won some promises: the U.S. would consider suspension of the lump sum payment and possibilities for annual payment; the Congress would send a fact-finding group to Okinawa; and acquisition of new land for the Marine Corps then being planned would be kept to an absolute minimum. (According to a message from CG, Rycom, to the Department of Army in August, the total acreage to be utilized by the Marines amounted to 46,678 acres including 25,433 privately owned land and 21,245 acres of Japanese Government land) 22
## TOTAL LAND. U.S. FORCES AND AGENCY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Leased</th>
<th>Japanese Land</th>
<th>Reclaimed</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td>20,645.81</td>
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<td><strong>FBIS</strong></td>
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<td><strong>U.S. State Dept</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Coast Guard</strong></td>
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<td><strong>GARIOA Housing</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Total Land Under</strong></td>
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<td>42,952.92</td>
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<td>U.S. Control</td>
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<td><strong>Marine Plan</strong></td>
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<td>Classified</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL</strong></td>
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<td><strong>22,858.46</strong></td>
<td><strong>55.66</strong></td>
<td><strong>85,842.92</strong></td>
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(from Memorandum to CA, Subject: Land Acquisition, 7 Oct. 55)