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Symbols, Forms, and Normative Practices of Cultural Identification: Ethnography of Speaking and Intercultural Communication

Katsuyuki Miyahira

I. Introduction

Self, society, and speaking are the most potent themes that are encoded in people's "ways of speaking" (Carbaugh, 1989; Miyahira, 1995; Philipsen, 1989, 1992). Past studies in the ethnography of communication have unveiled a multitude of ways in which interlocutors give voice to a distinctive sense of self, construct a shared sense of society, and exchange shared cultural resources through communicating, which in turn renews distinctive notions of self and society. Since Hymes's (1962) initial call for such studies, the field has produced a rich corpus of data on cultural symbols, forms, and normative communicative conduct which distinguish one from the others because of their distinctiveness (Bauman and Sherzer, 1989; Carbaugh, 1990; see Philipsen and Carbaugh, 1986 for a bibliography of fieldwork). Building on this development, it seems productive at this juncture to compare cultural symbols, forms, and normative communicative conduct from a particular theoretical vantage point such as discursive enactments of cultural identity.

My motives for the proposal are two-fold. First, by conducting such a survey one can learn, from the ethnographic diversity, the means and ends by which speech gives voice to distinctive cultural identity. This understanding will in turn shed light on the nature of cultural identity: what it is, and how it is interactively constructed, maintained (or changed), ratified (or marginalized), and negotiated through communication. The
second motive is theoretical on the one hand and practical on the other. An attempt to portray patterns and themes observed in the cross-cultural variation is a logical development of the goals of ethnography of communication. Hymes (1974) claims that "only in relation to actual (descriptive comparative) analysis will it be possible to conduct arguments analogous to those now possible in the study of grammar as to the adequacy, necessity, generality, etc. of concepts and terms" (discovered through the ethnography of communication). A ubiquitous concept such as cultural identity, I believe, is an effective anchoring point for investigating such a theoretical inquiry. Such attempts will, in the long run, contribute to cross-cultural as well as intercultural theorizing of "ways of speaking." Practically, in our everyday life in which intercultural encounters are not so much a rarity as a banality, individuals are expected to have the communicative competence to express one's preferred identity and acknowledge others, as well as the communicative competence to coordinate mutual identities through discourse. My inquiry serves this end as well by searching what can be learned from representative studies of cultural ways of speaking about self and society.

II. Cultural Identity and Human Communication

What is the exact relationship between cultural identity and human communication? The position taken in this paper is grounded in communication studies. Identification, an act of identifying oneself with the communal, is fundamentally a communication process; some forms of communication are enactments of cultural identity. I concur with Hecht, Collier, and Ribeau (1993) about the basic premises regarding a communication-based interpretive approach to identity:

The basic premise of this new theoretical stance is that identity is inherently a communication process and must be understood as a
transaction in which messages are exchanged. These messages are symbolic linkages between and among people that, at least in part, are enactments of identity. The new theory extends identity beyond individual and societal constructions to the interaction. (p. 161; emphases added)

Cultural identity in such an interactional model requires that a locus of analysis be set on the process of co-construction of identity; thus my focus of inquiry shifts from identity to identification. Accordingly, this paper goes beyond dealing with the phenomena simply in terms of cultural symbols; it addresses the ways in which such symbols are used and played out in the lives of native people.

Cultural identity in interpretive perspective is a multifaceted, malleable, and situated concept which is discursively and intersubjectively constructed. Collier and Thomas (1988) define cultural identity as "identification with and perceived acceptance into a group that has a shared system of symbols and meanings as well as norms/rules for conduct (p. 113). Cultural identity is an abstraction configured by a set of "ideal types," to borrow Weber's (1977) term. Ideal types are "formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena" (Dallmayr and McCarthy, 1977, p. 20). These are analogous to the "cognitive prototypes" which have become popular in social cognition research (see Pavitt and Haight, 1985) as well as the Model Person introduced in the politeness strategies by Brown and Levinson (1987). Prototypes serve as models of what is considered a proper person in a specific cultural context. These prototypes of person and society serve as a kind of lens through which we make sense of our experience of cultural identification. Understanding of a cultural identity, therefore, hinges on identification with ideal types because they are an amalgam of a variety of value constellations,
enabling one to situate and make sense of the significance of particular cultural events.

Hecht, Collier, and Ribeau's (1993) new theory is informative to my inquiry on two accounts. First, they use what they call sensitizing concepts to describe the complex phenomenon of identity. The five most predominant sensitizing concepts they propose are symbols, prescriptions, codes, conversation, and community. The gist of their descriptions follows (p. 161-4). (1) "Identity may be seen as a core symbol," thus justifying my focus on symbols of cultural identification. (2) "Identity also prescribes modes of conduct." This is one reason I focus on normative practices of cultural identification. (3) "Identity is a code for being" as has been demonstrated by Philipsen's (1992) account of the code of honor and the code of dignity. (4) "Identity may be viewed as a narrative told to oneself or existing within a culture." This draws general attention to the communicative enactment of identity in everyday conversation. Hecht, et. al. further contend that identity enactment exists on both content and relationship levels. (5) "Identities are located in communal memberships." In addition, Hecht, et. al. provide four frames of identity where one can locate the distinctive realizations of sensitizing concepts. The four frames are personal, enacted, relational, and communal. They claim that "frames are means of interpreting reality that provide a perspective for understanding the social world" (p. 165). These frames help researchers to locate where identity is "stored." My particular interest in this analysis is the investigation of how these four frames of identity play out in talk and how they interrelate with one another. Thus, this paper underscores the polyphony of communal identification and socially constructed self in interactions. The survey also includes my own analysis and synthesis of others' finding as they pertain to cultural identification. Thus, the goal of this survey is to organize the symbols, forms, and
normative communicative practices salient in cultural identification. Let me begin with the cases perhaps most popularly known.

III. Ethnography of Communication Studies on Cultural Identification

American voices of "self" reveal their cultural significance in Carbaugh's (1988) study of Donahue discourse. The term, American, is used here to refer to a particular speech community. It can be replaced by what Philipsen (1992) termed as "Nacirema" (American spelled backward) which refers generally to a particular culture, a particular way of thinking and acting--a way that does not necessarily include all North Americans or all citizens of the United States of America, but which is prominently associated with some of the history and some of the contemporary texture of life that can be observed there (p. vii). In order to understand the cultural resources of the American speech community and the ways in which people use such resources in their talk, Carbaugh looked for the cultural symbols and symbolic forms that construct an American view of personhood, and how that view is related to their everyday speech. He asks: How are persons symbolized in Donahue talk? What model of persons is used here to evaluate issues and actors? (p. 5) Through an extensive study of the television program using an ethnography of communication and interpretive anthropology perspective, he found what he calls three cultural codes of "self." As any culture is known to possess some notions of self, and because cultural identity is a part of self (Hecht, et. al., 1993, p. 35), the unfolding of the American "self" portrays a profile of a person every interlocutor pays homage to.

First, in the Donahue American scene, the person is symbolized as "an individual" (p. 109). In this cultural code, each individual is endowed with rights to construct the world in his own way (p. 26-7).
Similarly, individuals have the right to state almost any opinion, and each individual is expected to be non-judgmental and tolerant of others' expressed opinions. This code of individualism shapes social interaction in a particular fashion because one needs to respect others' rights at the same time as one exercises one's own. Carbaugh formulates a communication rule: "When stating a position or opinions, one should speak only for oneself and not impose one's opinions on others" (p. 30). In the same line of reasoning, the code of individual orientation proclaims a personal "choice." Individuals have a right to make choices and if deprived of such right, one feels "ripped off." With regard to cultural identification, Carbaugh notes that when individuals make rightful choices and state rightful opinions, others can see an enactment of identity. For example, a woman's identification with a full-fledged career person is encoded in her talk (p. 54).

Second, within this cultural code, the individual has a "self." Individuals fictionalize their self and speak about it in terms of an array of independent-dependent, aware-unaware, and communicative-closed meanings. They speak about the fictionalized self as a container in their personal stories, metaphors, and cultural myths. Third, self is symbolized over and against traditional social roles. In other words, the individual cultural orientation is diametrically opposed to the cultural persona prevalent in traditional societies. Philipsen's (1992) theory of speech codes (the code of dignity in this case) becomes illustrative in the American scene of Donahue.

Carbaugh further argues that individuals enact such culturally shaped notions of self and personhood in everyday communication of ritual celebrations. The ritual celebrates the symbol of "being honest" to one's inner feelings and to the world as well as "sharing" one's resources with others for the purpose of expressing one's feelings and supporting common
purposes with others. Therefore, "self" is an American cultural category thematized in a distinctive way. "Communication" is a ritual which pays homage to this sacred cultural object. Carbaugh builds on Katriel and Philipsen's (1981) finding that close, supportive, and flexible "communication" is a Nacirema speaking ritual which gives voice to culturally distinctive notions of self and community. Using Hymes's (1972, 1974) descriptive framework, both studies identified that the ritual is a particular form of cultural communication. Its function is, what I call, cultural identification. Katriel and Philipsen (1981) claim that "communication' is a culturally distinctive solution to the universal problem of fusing the personal with the communal" (p. 345). It resolves the tension by simultaneously validating the culturally salient self and achieving commonality with the community. "Communication" overcomes the problems of relationships by "working" on them and at the same time it constructs one's self within the social relationship. Therefore, American cultural identity resides in both personal and communal frames, and the "communication" ritual is a Nacirema form of cultural identification.

In his pioneering studies of "ways of speaking," Philipsen (1975) states that "talk is not everywhere valued equally; nor is it anywhere valued equally in all social contexts (p. 13)." He demonstrates his claim by presenting ethnographic descriptions of male role enactment in Teamsterville, the imaginary name of a city in Chicago. The findings from participant observation and ethnographic interviews depict that Teamstervillers' "speech situation" for men centers around the social identity relationship of the interlocutors. When the social relationship of the participants in a situation is symmetrical, it leads to a great amount of talking among Teamsterville men. On the other hand, a high quantity of speaking is considered inappropriate in situations in which
the participants' identity relationship is asymmetrical (p. 15). The Teamsterville moral code prefers role enactments of physical confrontation over "talking out" the confrontational situation on occasions of insult or threat to a man's credibility. Teamsterville boys became increasingly uncomfortable when they found out that their non-native group worker (leader) would instead respond to such a situation with speech or silence. Furthermore, because speech is an appropriate form of communication only when solidarity among members is conspicuous, it marks a breach of norms when a teacher or a director, endowed with power over students, talks to misbehaving students to discipline them. Because such behavior breaks a cultural norm, it is counter effective. Speaking or refraining from speaking poignantly gives voice to a cultural prototype of the Teamsterville male; hence cultural identification is fundamentally a communication process.

In a sequel to his earlier work, Philipsen (1976) explains the natives' view of culturally appropriate "personae" and "scene" in Teamsterville speech, and further locates them in their "cultural scheme of things." The four places of speaking found in the study are the neighborhood, the street, the corner, and the porch. Whereas the use of dialect in such places reinforces the membership of the community, deviation from the dialect or the conversion of the Teamsterville dialect indicates to its members disloyalty to the group norm. The street offers a place for socialization. Teamsterville men congregate at porches and corners to mark their territory and share a view of a model persona and the discursive practices appropriate to those two places. The front porch serves as a link between street and home, providing opportunities for women to participate in social life. Hence the cultural personae defined by social roles are encoded in the places and their (possible lack of)
speaking in those places. Although the notions of self portrayed in Teamsterville community are dramatically different from unique individual self in the Nacirema community, speaking in both communities enacts cultural prototypes of a Model Person.

Rosaldo (1982) presents a different view of self which she discovered among Ilongots in the Philippines. She argues that the Ilongot ways of thinking about language and about human agency and personhood are intimately linked in a way that it is distinctively more consensual than the Western notion of self. The Ilongot view of speech is tantamount to their actions. For example, through enacting commands (*tuydek*), they articulate and shape ongoing forms of social order. In other words, a command itself (for it, by definition, predicates speaker's knowledge and hearer's movement), constitutes communicative norms regarding who can address commands to whom within a particular context. This presents a vivid contrast with the Nacirema conception of an individual self who can say almost everything he wants to at any time (Carbaugh, 1988). “Language was, in Ilongot view, a paradigm of thought. Thoughts were seen as utterances of the heart. And human choice and effort were themselves construed as a response to silent *tuydek* through which the knowing heart could give directions to unknowing hands” (p. 209). This practice-based conception of self is highly contrastive with the rational Nacirema self. Rosaldo supports this point in the following statements:

[W]hat Ilongots lack from a perspective such as ours is something like our notion of an inner self continuous through time, a self whose actions can be judged in terms of the sincerity, integrity, and commitment actually involved in his or her bygone pronouncements. Because Ilongots do not see their inmost 'hearts' as constant causes, independent of their acts, they have no reasons to 'commit' themselves to future deeds, or feel somehow guilt-stricken or in need of an account when subsequent actions prove their earlier expressions false. (p. 218)
What is lurking in the background of this large disparity in folk epistemology and paradigms of human communication are idiosyncratic notions of self and subsequent identification. What Ilongots do with words of commands can only be found in their actions. It presumes the “sameness” among persons; it is a relational—rather than intentional— patterning of speaking where the self is enmeshed in the notion of society as opposed to the Western autonomous self (Carbaugh, 1988).

This different worldview leads Ilongots to practice a highly distinctive form of identification which is dramatically different from the Nacirema version. The frame of identity is primarily enacted whereas it was quintessentially personal in Nacirema community. The location of cultural identity for Ilongots is not a inner rational self which aspires to “express” its feelings; rather it resides in their “actions,” in which social relations are organized contemporaneously with the communicative enactment of social hierarchy. Thus identification figures predominantly in speaking within a mutable, emergent, communal life-world. In both Nacirema and Ilongot communities, one finds enactments of identity in communication; however, whereas Nacirema identity enactment fuses the self and the communal, the Ilongot self is “consubstantial” with the communal in their actions.

IV. Interethnic Identification

Ethnography of communication studies have also shown that encounters with members of different cultures often lead to insurmountable miscommunications and stereotyping. One major reason for this difficulty is difference in the presentation of cultural identity. In addition to the preceding case studies, elsewhere I have described the Western Apache version of such cultural identity, which is a flip-flopped symbol of ‘the Whiteman,’ and compared it with a portrait of Israeli Sabra identity as
revealed in their direct speech (Miyahira, 1995) as well as a Japanese American synthesis of two cultural models (Miyahira, 1993). Given the diversity of symbols, forms, and communicative conduct of identification, it is natural to expect intercultural/interethnic misunderstanding and potential conflicts as well as efficacious coordination of identification.

Scollon and Scollon (1981) investigated such multivocal presentations of cultural identity in Athabaskan-English communicative interactions. They organized the study in terms of four central research domains: the presentation of self, the distribution of talk, information structure, and content organization. (Notice how their analytical framework assumes the kind of self described in Nacirema code, in which one “has” a unique self that needs expressing.) Their discussion of presentation of self is particularly informative to my investigation. Drawing on Goffman’s (1974) account of presentation of self, they show how some of the crippling stereotypes held by each group actually originate in their inability to acknowledge the other’s culturally coded voices of cultural identity. Scollon and Scollon’s observation of the relationship between volubility and dominance is particularly pertinent:

When the relationship is one of dominance and submission, this problem is accentuated by a different linkage of dominance, display, and dependence. The English speaker expects the dominant person to be the quiet one, the spectator, and expects that aid will only be given where there is a legal or strong social requirement. The Athabaskan expects the dominant person to be the main speaker, the exhibitionist, and to maintain his dominance by giving help to the ones he dominates. The difficulties produced by these different linkages of dominance, display, and dependence are further compounded by the English speaker’s assumption that one will put his best foot forward and the Athabaskan assumption that one will not speak very well of himself. (p. 21; emphasis added)

Given this disparity in what is considered as a proper person and actions, each group fails to acknowledge the other’s preferred cultural identification, and, as a consequence, they stereotype each other. To
avoid such stereotyping, it becomes important to understand the symbols and forms through which members of each group present their preferred cultural identity. Scollon and Scollon point out that investigation of structural features of cultural discourse (i.e., distribution of talk, use of paralinguistic and nonverbal attributes, and localized ways of organizing information) is an important beginning toward alleviating the stereotyped ethnic attitudes. An understanding of these structural features is important in diagnosing stereotypical behavior. These structural features also help describe what is more deeply at stake: fundamental understandings of symbols, forms, and normative codes which govern interlocutors' communicative practice of cultural identification.

"Fictionalization of self" (Scollon and Scollon, 1981) in children's socialization is a good example of a form of cultural identification. In a comparative study on the literacy of an English-speaking child and an Athabaskan child, Scollon and Scollon have found that the English-speaking child projected herself as a third person in the stories she told, thus showing her understanding of the difference between authorship and the character in the text. Such transposition enables one to objectify one's own self. Scollon and Scollon further argue that such fictionalization of one's own self is required for obtaining "essayist literacy" (p. 61). However, they did not find a comparable case of fictionalization in the Athabaskan child. An oral culture among the Athabaskans shows overriding concern for abstract formal structuring of the narrative content (i.e., a four-part narrative structure), instead of the information structuring and fictionalization of self in primarily literal culture of English. It may be the case that English-speaking children construct their cultural identity through a method comparable to the fictionalization of self. However, in the similarly oral culture of the Western Apache, a girl spontaneously transposed herself to "the Whiteman" or a schoolteacher,
which I believe is an oral version of fictionalization of self. Thus fictionalization may be a primary form of identity enactment irrespective of the type of community and the type of literacy.

Interethnic communication in the classroom of a Warm Springs Indian community presents another problematic issue in intercultural encounters. In order to account for the Warm Springs children's apparent inability to understand classroom instructions, Philips (1983) observed classrooms with a particular focus on participant structure. The four major structural patterns of classroom discourse are whole class (show and tell), small group (group project), one-to-one, and (nonverbal) desk work. By focusing on the particular communication phenomenon of floor-taking, Philips systematically unpacks the complex and covert mechanism of student-teacher interactions as well as interactions among students in the classroom. She found that teachers used "choral," "round," and "first-come, first served" rules to ensure equal opportunity for students to voice their opinions. However, teachers' ratification patterns selectively incorporate those students' utterances heard and judged to be appropriate or correct, and ignore those that are heard to be incorrect and inappropriate. These ratification patterns may be Anglo role enactments of teachers which are wholly incomparable with what the Warm Springs children expect. "Thus, when we consider not just who spoke, but who was heard and verbally defined by the teacher as having contributed to the interaction, it is apparent that some children's speech may be ratified more often than others" (p. 89-90). Based on these observations, Philips concludes that the difficulties in classroom interaction are largely due to the incompatibility of Anglo and Warm Springs systems for the regulating turns at talk (p. 115).

This type of classroom dynamic culminates to general perception of Warm Springs children's noncomprehension in several ways. First, Warm
Springs children respond less often to teachers' questions to show their comprehension. Secondly, Warm Springs children frequently face situations where their responses are judged as inappropriate or they are not ratified by the teacher. Thirdly, Warm Springs children rarely respond to teachers' questions and, when they do, their responses show that they are not sure about their comprehension themselves. Upon finding these patterns, Philips argues that Warm Springs Indians are enculturated to an idiosyncratic modes of organizing verbal transactions which are culturally distinct from those of the Anglo middle class: "This difference makes it more difficult for them to then comprehend verbal messages conveyed through the American school's Anglo middle class modes of organizing classroom interaction" (p. 4).

The findings from this study of interethnic classroom communication shed light on the normative communicative conduct and cultural ethos of Warm Springs Indians. Warm Springs Indians are not used to appealing to a single individual for permission to speak; rather, they determine whether to speak or not by themselves. They are expected to be self-sufficient and cooperative; they are not likely to compete with other students. Furthermore, similar to an Athabaskan norm, Warm Springs children don’t draw attention to themselves; “showing academic excellence” in Anglo eyes is “putting oneself above others” in their view. Therefore, particular participants structures which are conducive to the learning of Warm Springs children are one-to-one interactions or small group projects because: (1) turns at talk are controlled by themselves instead of others; (2) children can engage in group plays or games for a longer period of time and address a greater number of people; (3) children can form preferred single-gender groups. Underlying the asynchrony of interethnic encounters described in this paper are distinctive and deeply-felt notions of cultural identity that lead interlocutors to enact a unique set of communicative
practices. Self, society, and speaking are interwoven in Warm Springs children's life; understanding the cultural meanings of these cultural symbols is indispensable to interethnic coordination of identification.

V. Summary: Cross-Cultural Comparisons

Towards the end of developing a theory of cultural identification, case studies reviewed in this paper, and my earlier work mentioned before, are compared and contrasted across cases. Observations across the case studies show that localized symbols and meanings of cultural identification are plentiful (see Table 1: Summary of Case Studies). Although all communication may not be symbolic and may not carry culture-rich meanings in all contexts, symbols of identification are abundant in everyday, mundane conversations. Communication is therefore a problematic domain of analysis regarding cultural identification. Forms of cultural identification are multiplex, too. In general, various forms of rituals take place in communities where the code of dignity prevails: specifically, Nacirema and Israeli Sabra communities. These communities place moral priorities on individuals, over those personae which are defined by social roles. Although ritual is the archetypal form of cultural communication in a 'traditional' society (Philipsen, 1987, p. 254), cross-cultural comparisons show that ritual also prevails in 'personal' society whose cultural symbols are predominantly "self," "individual," and uniqueness of a person. Another conspicuous form of cultural identification is the dialectic interplay between two cultural codes. Basso (1976), Katriel (1986), and Yanagisako (1985), each with different disciplinary training, all feature this cultural dynamics. The dialectic interplay is enacted in different communicative practices, but the same cultural forces (interplay of speech codes) are captured in such communicative practices. The cross-cultural comparisons have shown
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that, at least to some degree, cultural identity figures prominently in the dialectic interplay of two cultural impulses.

With regard to normative communicative practices, this meta-analysis reveals two distinctive patterns of cultural identification. One is individual, in which the self centrifugally reaches out to the communal in order to affirm one's identity and simultaneously establish shared communal identity. The other is communal, where the communal centripetally reaches in to its members in order to resolve communal-individual tension. Each pattern may be subsumed under, what Philipsen (1992) called, the code of dignity and the code of honor respectively. Cultural symbols of identity within the code of dignity are extensively pursued in research, whereas the paucity of well-articulated symbols and meanings of the code of honor is evident in the field. Rosaldo's (1982), Scollon and Scollon's (1981), and Philips' (1983) studies were responses to the Western research paradigm. Future research needs to initiate case studies of the code of honor so that we can account for the cultural symbols and meanings equivalent to those of the code of dignity and learn from cross-cultural comparisons.

This review also found some typical patterns of cultural identification in intercultural encounters. Cultural identification is at the crux of problems of intercultural miscommunication. Different conceptions of the self and the communal, and wide variations in patterns of identification make it extremely difficult not to adopt a skeptical attitude toward the potential for successful intercultural interaction. This review shows that the cultural differences often result in the stereotyping, misunderstanding and repression of out-group people in school settings. Future research needs to address the problematics of identification in intercultural settings; how is it similar to and different from intracultural identification? How can we better understand the
process so that we can develop pedagogical designs to improve intercultural skills? The mutable, emergent, relational and social facts of identity warrant and encourage such effort.

Notes

1 Identification in this paper is analogous to Burke's (1969) rhetoric of identification. He argues that in being identified with another person, a person is "substantially one" with a person other than himself in sharing substances such as objects, attitudes, beliefs, and values. "You persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with it" (p. 55). In other words, in order to form attitudes or to induce action in other human agents, one needs to "identify" with the person, and thus establish a "consubstantial" reality with the person, by coming to share a common language.

2 Hecht, Collier and Ribeau equivocate the term by calling it a "sensitizing constructs" in other parts of their book. However, given that each sensitizing concept manifests itself in multiple ways in situ and that the term, construct, suggests operationalization of the complex ideas at the risk of theoretical reduction, I opt for "sensitizing concepts" for its adequacy.

3 Scallon and Scollon (1981) feature ongoing negotiation of an intersubjective reality through performances of individual self. In everyday conversation we see presentation of an individual's conception of self and its change due to the dramatization of others' view of self. They summarize that "the subjective reality of each participant in a conversation is checked out against the reality of each other participant as an ongoing negotiation through which we create a social world" (p. 14).

References


－論文要約－

文化的自己像の表現としてのコミュニケーション行動
－ことばの民族誌と異文化コミュニケーションの事例研究から－

宮平 勝行

コミュニケーション学において、言語共同体独自の話すことばの意味を記述・解明することがひとつの研究テーマである。各共同体に特有の「自己像」や「社会」、「ことば」の意味がどのように記号化されるのか、そして文化的に定義されたこれらの意味を独自の発話形式でどのように表明するのかということが問われてきた。その一端として、ことばの民族誌や異文化接触の研究に基づき、多様な文化的シンボルの意味やコミュニケーション行動の形式と規範というものが明らかにされている。本稿では、これらの事例研究をいくつか取り上げ、比較対照することによって、話すことばによる自己表現の文化的な特徴や異文化間での類似点と相違点について考えてみる。

「自己」や「社会」は文化のシンボルとして特殊な意味を帯びており、それに伴い「コミュニケーション」、「命令」、「模倣」、「自己表現」等の発話行為も特殊化され、言語共同体独自の意味を含むことになる。こうしたシンボルの意味を言語共同体独自のコミュニケーション儀式や話し方の論理の枠内で捉えると、コミュニケーション行動の一部は常に文化的行為であることがある。まとめとして、文化的自己に関するシンボルと発話形式、更に模範的なコミュニケーション行動を「個人」、「他者関係」、「行為」、「共同体」という四種の自己像のフレームにまとめてみた。こうしたメタアナラシスから得られる類似点と相違点が異文化接触にもたらす影響は大きい。

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